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INTRODUCTION	  
	  	  
The upsurge in Islamist-based terrorism has thrust the concept of radicalism to the 
forefront of political and academic vocabulary, and it has become the “main frame for 
explaining, and preventing young Muslims from engaging in radical activities” (Sedgwick qtd. in 
Lindekilde). Following the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attack on the United States in 2001, 
concepts such as “home grown terrorism” have become increasingly salient. In the United States, 
there is also heightened concern for the safety of American citizens, as well as an increased 
suspicion of people from nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. As the “War on Terror” 
continues, I turn my eye to the small country of Denmark, which has recently joined the United 
States and Belgium in combatting fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and 
other extremist groups.   
Denmark’s involvement in the War on Terror is partly because of its vested interest in 
decreasing the presence of Danish Muslims in Iraq and Syria, who have gone to fight alongside 
extremist groups such as ISIS. Thomas Hegghammer, Director of Terrorism Research at the 
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment noted, “Denmark has a large radicalized 
environment compared to the size of the country” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a 
Radical”).  Adding to the concern is the enduring tension between the Danish majority and 
Muslims following the 9/11 attacks, as well as the subsequent policies targeting Muslims. 
Although the angst about radicalization has its roots in security concerns, it is also related to a 
wider debate on how Western liberal democracies should relate to, and integrate, especially 
Muslim minorities [sic]” (Lindekilde 110).   	  
Traditionally, Denmark has been known as a progressive and liberal country, tolerant 
towards alternative beliefs and lifestyles while still emphasizing the importance and value of 
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social cohesion and equality (Mouritsen and Olsen 691). “It was the first to legalize pornography 
and recognize gay marriages” (Mouritsen and Olsen 691). Known for its functioning welfare 
system and its interest and involvement in international human rights issues, Denmark has shown 
itself to be an international contender and defender of the rights of others, including minorities. 
Denmark’s international position as a global humanitarian promoter is evidenced by its long list 
of signed and ratified human rights conventions and treaties, which it is obligated to uphold (see 
Appendix). Recognized as the world’s happiest nation by the “World Happiness Report” in 2012 
and 2013 (“Happiest in the World”), and ranked first on the list of “world’s most responsible 
governments” by the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, on the basis of government 
accountability and criminal justice (Botero et al. 54), Denmark has amassed an impressive 
international record.  	  
Denmark made headlines once again in 2014 with the implementation of a landmark law 
allowing transgender men and women to legally change their gender. The first of its kind in 
Europe, this law has garnered international attention, especially because of Amnesty 
International’s 2014 report, The State Decides Who I Am, which reveals the Human Rights 
violations of other European countries against people trying to change their gender (“World 
Must Follow Denmark’s Example”). Heralded by Amnesty International as a “progressive and 
courageous step,” the organization says that the world should follow Denmark’s example 
(“World Must Follow Denmark’s Example”).  
Domestically, however, Denmark’s standard of human rights engagement for religious 
and ethnic minorities (namely immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers) has not been as 
impressive. Denmark’s treatment of women, refugees and asylum seekers, for instance, has put 
the country in violation of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
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(CEDAW) as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) policies 
towards refugees and asylum seekers (“Denmark Human Rights”). Despite Denmark’s glowing 
reviews from Rule of Law Index, the document also criticized the state on “police discrimination 
against foreigners and ethnic minorities,” and noted this a “problem” (54). In the same light, a 
recent article from Amnesty International outlined its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers: 	  
• In August [2013], in the middle of the night, police raided a church in Copenhagen, and 
detained a number of Iraqi asylum-seekers who had sheltered there for months. There 
were complaints that the police used excessive force to remove people who were 
demonstrating in solidarity with the asylum-seekers. 	  
• During the year [2013], 38 Iraqi asylum-seekers were forcibly returned to Iraq, including 
at least 25 to central and southern Iraq contrary to the advice of UNHCR, the UN refugee 
agency. 	  
• Newly arrived refugees and other aliens were still only entitled to between 45 and 65 per 
cent of regular welfare benefits, giving rise to concern that this would lead to their being 
destitute. (“Denmark Human Rights”)	  
Although the Danish list of human rights violations is comparatively shorter than many other 
countries, Denmark’s struggle with addressing immigrant affairs makes this one of Denmark’s 
key shortcomings, gravely impacting ethnic and religious minorities in Denmark. 	  
The state of religious and ethnic minorities in the country is, perhaps now more than ever, 
an important part of the human rights discourse. The increase in Danish Muslims’ involvement 
in extremist activities with groups such as ISIS (which is well known for a wave of beheadings 
as well as the kidnappings of numerous women) has sparked a response from Denmark that is 
unlike many other European countries. In an article from the Guardian, David Crouch and Jon 
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Henley noted, “Denmark has produced more fighters per head of population since 2012 than any 
other Western European country except Belgium. [Therefore]…Denmark has been at the 
forefront of exploring new models for preventing extremism” (“A Way Home for Jihadis”). In 
addition to joining the military fights against ISIS, Denmark has begun a de-radicalization 
program for jihadi fighters returning from Syria. 	  
This initiative is the successor to another radicalization prevention project the Danish 
government embarked on in 2008, an action plan called “A Common and Safe Future.” The 
project was to be overseen by the Center for Prevention – a sector of the Danish Security and 
Intelligence Service (PET). According to the PET, the goal of the program was to “encourage 
people to change their behaviour towards a non-extremist direction by means of direct contact 
and dialogue. The idea [was] for PET to support the actors that are best placed to reach 
vulnerable people by equipping them with tools for tackling the difficult challenges” (“The 
Centre for Prevention”). 	  
Lasse Lindekilde, a researcher in the Department of Political Science at Aarhus 
University in Denmark, notes that “A Common and Safe Future” has been targeted towards 
Muslims, thus suggesting that Muslims are violence-prone “radicals” who should be encouraged 
to become active citizens in Danish society (110). Lindkelde also asserted that the action plan 
would have “inotropic effects” due to its programming structure as well as its hard focus on 
Muslims (110).  With Denmark’s shift in focus from radicalization prevention to de-
radicalization, along with the general salience in discourse on terrorism and radicalization, this 
thesis asks the question:  “Have Denmark’s immigration and integration policies contributed to 
the growing radicalization of the Muslim minority in the country?”  	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Denmark was once a largely homogeneous nation before the rise of immigration in the 
1970’s. The inflow of immigrants from Turkey, Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and Morocco 
onto Danish soil triggered a set of social and political changes in reaction to the emerging 
diversity. Chapter One will provide an overview of Denmark before the rise in immigration, and 
also examine the changes in the social and political climate following the increase in immigrants. 
Chapter One will also chronicle the rise of the immigrant presence in Denmark, starting with 
immigrants who were considered “guest workers” and then immigrants fleeing to the country to 
escape the Yugoslav war. In Chapter One, I show that perceptions of immigrants to Denmark 
changed – negatively – as immigrant rates increased. Immigrants went from being “welcomed” 
as “guests” who provide cheap labor, to being perceived as a social problem and potential burden 
to the welfare state (Jønsson 593). The rise of anti-immigration organizations, and the rise in far 
right populism also advanced the discourse on immigration in Denmark.   	  
Focusing on the years following 9/11, Chapter Two discusses the Danish emphasis on the 
integration/assimilation of the migrant population, as evidenced by the gradual tightening of 
Denmark’s citizenship laws during the years 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2010. Chapter Two 
also explores the impact immigration laws had on immigrants’ chances of receiving Danish 
citizenship. From this, I reveal the underlying bias towards certain immigrants over others, and 
the resulting divide between the “good” and “bad” immigrants. In Chapter Two, I trace the 
construction of Danish immigration policy through the influence of several factors: religion, 
Danish language, pride in the welfare state and Grundtvigian philosophy. Overall, Chapter Two 
provides a conceptual understanding of the Danish philosophy of integration, while also 
revealing the ways in which the desire to protect the Danish culture and belief system has 
informed their policies and, in turn, impacted immigrants.  
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Chapter Three focuses on the adoption of internal and external securitization measures in 
Denmark after the September 11 attacks in the USA. Key to the discussion is an analysis of the 
ways in which Denmark’s cultural and religious history merged with this larger event, to create a 
set of policies targeting Muslim immigrants and Muslims living in Denmark. Chapter Three 
reveals the normalization of a deep distrust of Muslims living in Denmark, and of immigrants 
from Islamic countries, after 9/11, as well as the restructuring of the Muslim image into “the 
usual suspects.” In Chapter Three, I discuss how immigration, integration and security have 
intersected in crucial ways. I also review the infamous Cartoon Controversy, an event that 
sparked a debate between Muslims and the majority on free speech versus discrimination, while 
simultaneously triggering an outcry from the Muslim community that was so large it marked the 
first time since the Thirty Years War that a conflict with religious connotations had such an 
impact in Danish society (Rudling 76). 	  
Chapter Four examines the Muslim response to their constant state of hyper-visibility 
brought on by the media, the policies focused on them, as well as their social encounters with the 
majority. It chronicles the ways in which Muslims have chosen to cope with the situation in 
Denmark, showing that some have elected to use the hyper-visibility as a way to affirm their 
identity as Muslims, while others have either decided to withdraw from the public sphere or 
leave Denmark entirely, in search of a place where they will feel welcomed. Personal anecdotes 
cited from focus groups and interviews with several Danish Muslims supplement the discussion 
of policies and practices discussed in the previous chapters. Chapter Four examines the growth in 
the number of radicalized Muslims in Denmark and the ways in which the government is trying 
to address this issue.   	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Overall, this thesis outlines the demographic and political shifts in Denmark, which have 
contributed to its transformation from liberalism to nationalism. The thesis shows how domestic 
socio-political and cultural changes, as well as critical international events have played a role in 
establishing the importance of “Danishness,” while simultaneously causing apprehension 
towards anything or anyone that is considered “un-Danish.” The result is a weariness of different 
cultures and religions, as demonstrated in Denmark’s political atmosphere, which favors 
immigrant integration or assimilation over multiculturalism.  
This notion of “welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing 
factor [in society]” (Huysmans 753) is what makes the integration of migrant minorities difficult. 
Denmark’s immigration and integration policies, as they currently stand, are worrisome – not 
just because of their impact on Muslim migrant minorities – but also because they speak to the 
“wider politics of belonging, that is the struggle over cultural, racial and socio-economic criteria 
for the distribution of rights and duties in a community” (Huysmans 753). With ISIS still actively 
recruiting fighters to Syria,1 maintaining policies that lead to the creation of a disenfranchised 
population may defeat the purpose of having a de-radicalization program to begin with.  
On a broader scale, this is not just a Danish problem. It extends to other European 
countries such France, Austria and the Netherlands. No strangers to controversy, these countries 
have also had various incidences of cross-cultural tensions, as demonstrated by the Charlie 
Hebdo shootings in France (Vinograd et al.,“Charlie Hebdo”), the assassination of Theo Van 
Gogh in the Netherlands for his controversial film about Muslim culture (“Gunman Kills Dutch 
Film Director”) and the 2015 reform to the 1912 Islam Law in Austria, banning foreign funding 
for Muslims and Imams (“Austria Passes Controversial Reforms to 1912 Islam Law”). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Citing information from French authorities on the fighters joining ISIS, Richard Barrett, Senior Vice President of 
the Soufan Group, identifies ISIS recruits as “disaffected, aimless and lacking a sense of identity or belonging” (18).	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CHAPTER 1 
 The Transformation of the Liberal State  
  
Denmark today is often associated with its notion of homogeneity and smallness, tying in 
with the Danish model of egalitarianism and democracy (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). Less known 
is that Denmark was once a multinational power that ruled over territories in the Caribbean, 
Norway, southern Sweden, northern Germany and elsewhere (Campbell and Hall 21). 
Denmark’s territory was gradually diminished due to invasions (most notably the 1941 Nazi 
invasion of Denmark) and repeated lost wars that resulted in lost territory. The depletion of 
territory also led to decreased ethnic and linguistic diversity. Effectively, the loss of a 
heterogeneous mix of people resulted in a loss of multiculturalism, and gave birth to ethnic and 
linguistic homogenization (Campbell and Hall 22). These factors facilitated the conditions under 
which the Danish state could become ‘right-sized’ and ‘right-peopled’ in the sense that its 
homogeneity “created a strong, politically stable, and unified nation with a strong national 
identity” (Campbell and Hall 22). This identity, which was centered on the preservation of the 
Danish language, history and culture, became the foundation upon which Denmark was rebuilt 
after losing its territories. The focus on things considered inherently Danish and symbolic of the 
Danish identity is what I believe paved the way for the evolution of Denmark into a nation that 
placed egalitarianism above multiculturalism.  
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The Establishment of Danish Customs 
“Through language and history, a cultural nation is fashioned” 
(E.F Fain 80) 
 
The development of a Danish national identity began during the 17th century and peaked 
in the 19th century primarily because of the influence of the teachings of Nikolaj Frederik 
Grundtvig. Grundtvig and a dedicated group of supporters “took it upon themselves to define for 
Danish population their national identity” with teachings that surpassed social class divisions and 
stressed the importance of individual freedom, volunteerism, classic liberalism, popular 
education, free association and the development of civil society and social solidarity (Campbell 
and Hall 22). Education thus became a fundamental part of establishing national identity through 
the formation of Grundtvigian schools, which emphasized the teaching of Danish history, poetry 
and literature (Campbell and Hall 22).   
Grundvig’s teachings stressed the importance of learning the mother tongue/native 
language, and highlighted the concept of Denmark as the “fatherland” (Fain 80). Grundtvig 
believed that it was “natural for a child to speak his mother tongue, so it was natural for a people 
to speak its native language” (Fain 80). Grundtvig warned Danes “their souls would shrivel if 
they continued to speak German [and] he mocked them with an old proverb about French clothes 
looking ridiculous during a Danish winter” (Fain 80). Grundtvig believed that language and 
history were essential to Danes becoming their true selves. He saw “literature as the mirror of a 
people’s spirit and history [as] not only the record of a people’s growth but the manifestation of 
God’s divine plan” (Fain 80). Therefore, it was incumbent upon Danes to use their own language 
and know their own history in order to “express their essential spirit” (Fain 80). 
Initial literature on the fatherland theory portrays it as positioning Denmark as “the 
country in which one is citizen,” which meant that all members of the Danish state were 
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considered citizens, regardless of their place of birth and language (Brincker 356). This changed 
when an alternative definition of “fatherland” emerged a few years later, describing the term as 
exclusively representative of a shared language and place of birth (Brincker 356). 
Grudtvig’s teachings fueled the growing interest in the Danish language and history and 
the growing acceptance of the alternative definition of fatherland. This new interest was 
interpreted by historians as an indication of a “growing national interest,” which ultimately led to 
other things such as the creation of nationally engaged groups that published literature about 
Denmark as the “fatherland” (Brincker 356). The Law of Indigenous Rights symbolized the first 
step towards Danish nationalism. The law “restricted the occupation of official positions to 
people born within the borders of the Danish state” (Brincker 357). Although this law largely 
resulted from an increasing antagonistic view of Germans, the law was received positively 
(Brinckser 357) and is, in my opinion, a key piece of legislation demonstrating the shift towards 
a more nationalist agenda. 
 
The Rise of Immigration in Denmark  
Denmark’s change in attitude towards minority groups, particularly immigrants, was 
triggered by the rise of immigration and integration policies in Denmark after the 1960’s. The 
late 1960’s to early 1970’s were Denmark’s golden years, reflecting the expansion of the welfare 
state (Jønsson 593). During these years, Denmark, along with other Western European countries 
welcomed labor migrants, refugees and family reunifications from countries such as Turkey, 
Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and Morocco. The immigrant workers were welcomed to fill 
labor shortages, because the demand for labor exceeded the national labor force (Moore 361). 
The immigrants occupied largely the “lower-tier economic positions” (Moore 358). Nonetheless, 
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they were now in a society that promoted universal social rights as well as a highly unionized 
workforce (Jønsson 593).  
 These benefits resulted in rising concerns in the social and political spheres about the 
future of immigrant workers on the country. In the social sphere, a general consensus existed 
amongst Danish citizens that the immigrant workers would not stay. Therefore, they were 
regarded as either gæstearbejdere (guest workers) or fremmedarbejdstagere (foreign workers), 
thus suggesting that immigrant workers occupied a place of “otherness” from the wider Danish 
society (Moore 361). In the political sphere, “the guest-worker issue” became the topic of debate, 
as politicians discussed the concerns about how the universal welfare state could and should deal 
with the problems associated with immigration (Jønsson 593). In Denmark, the main problems 
included language barriers, discrimination in the labor and housing markets, facilitating leisure 
time activities, etc. (Jønsson 593).   
Initially, administrative changes and policies were attempted in order to assess, 
understand and then solve some of the political concerns (Jønsson 593). To start, the Elkær-
Hansen Commission was appointed by the Minister of Labor in 1969 to examine the entry-
related political issues as well as immigrant-policy implications regarding guest workers’ social 
problems and adaptation to Danish society. To ensure equality and avoid stigmatization, the 
Danish government included immigrants in the welfare-state system, assuring them the same 
rights and social-welfare as Danish citizens. To cement this policy, a guest worker was employed 
as a staff consultant at the Ministry of Social Affairs (Jønsson 593–594). Altogether, these were 
seen as ad hoc solutions in the absence of a genuine immigration policy.  
Immigration issues in Denmark took a further turn in 1973, following the oil crisis and 
subsequent recession that impacted the country (Fernandez and Jensen 1140). Adopting the 
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larger European pattern of closing borders to foreign labor, by prohibiting labor importation – 
with the exception of political refugees and family reunifications – Denmark also closed its 
borders to foreign labor, thus stopping the entry of new guest workers (Jønsson 593). This meant 
that only political refugees and family reunifications could obtain a permanent resident permit in 
Denmark. By this time, however, many guest workers had already earned the right to stay in the 
country, after already being there for some time. The absence of a comprehensive immigration 
policy, or official political reform to solve the challenges connected to immigration (such as 
increased pressure on the housing market and immigrants’ difficulties entering the labor market 
in an economic recession), left room for other political actors to “set the agenda, propose 
solutions and promote visions for the early Danish integration policy” (Jønsson 593).  
The aforementioned perception of immigrant workers being “guest workers” is key to 
understanding why a comprehensive immigrant policy was not yet developed. This idea of 
temporality “constituted the dominant policy framework in Denmark” (Jønsson 595), and thus 
created a divide in what were considered Denmark’s fundamental values. On the one hand, the 
universal welfare state was aimed at social integration, reducing inequality and so on (Jønsson 
595). On the other hand, the role of immigrant workers was to “repatriate once the economic 
boom came to an end,” therefore creating no good reason to have a national integration policy 
(Jønsson, 595).  
  
The Change: Immigrants as the Social Problem  
Politically, the debate on the establishment of a national immigration/integration policy 
was heightening in the early 1970’s (Jønsson, 595). The Socialist People’s Party was in favor of 
the creation of a coherent immigration policy, whereas the Conservative Party was not. The 
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Socialist People’s Party argued that the added support for immigrants was to come from state 
funding, as well as the employers of immigrant workers. Employers, whose interests were 
represented by the Conservative Party, were utterly opposed to this idea (Jønsson 595). Jens 
Fisker, the head of the employers’ organization was quoted as saying, “the guest workers are 
especially welcome first and foremost because this reserve does not cost anything, in contrary to 
a reserve of unemployed or housewives. If we do not need the labor, it can just be deported” 
(Schwartz qtd. in Jønsson 596). The concern, at the time, was regarding immigrant workers 
undercutting the wages of Danish workers or becoming the “new underclass in society” (Jønsson 
596).  
One of the biggest issues for immigrants was finding housing. The Vognmandsmarken 
controversy created a real problem for the Danish political system, which was criticized for the 
poor quality and slum-like conditions in which guest workers and immigrants were living 
(Jønsson 598). Deemed a “tragic effect” of the lack of political action in the housing policy, 
Ludvig Hansen from the Danish Communist Party agreed to continue the characteristic Danish 
“left-wing-line” towards immigrants on the grounds that since Denmark invited immigrant 
workers to the country, the Danish political system was obliged to provide adequate 
accommodations for them (Jønsson 598).  
With the social democratic stronghold in the country, the left-wing line was maintained in 
other ways. In 1983, a liberal law was passed. Considered one of the most liberal laws in the 
world at the time, the 1983 immigration law gave refugees the “legal right to asylum and family 
reunification. Immigrants (including immigrant workers already residing in Denmark) enjoyed 
the full rights of the welfare state and could vote in local elections after three years of residence” 
(Mouritsen and Olsen 691). Speaking in regard to the law, Bjorn Elmquist of the Liberal Party in 
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Denmark stated that “the law created a big consistent link between fighting for human rights ‘in 
the big world' and not discriminating on the basis of nationality ‘here at home in our own 
house’” (Jensen qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen 694). This idea of social citizenship and community 
heightened the recognition of Denmark as a pinnacle of internationalism and humanitarianism. It 
also made Denmark an attractive option for immigrants. By allowing guest workers access to 
these rights, Denmark became a secure option for them and their families through family 
reunification. Family reunification therefore meant a further influx of immigrants and the 
children of immigrants.  
The inception of the 1983 immigration law also marked the heightening of concerns with 
immigration on the political and social spheres. Mass immigration was perceived as a threat to 
two important factors of the Danish society: the welfare economy and Danish culture. The slight 
uneasiness that emerged in the 1970s was about to become more serious. By the mid 1980s, the 
inexpensive labor migrants were replaced by asylum seekers and refugees, creating a more 
noticeable shift in the Danish perceptions of immigrants (Moore 358). As the demand for the 
labor of migrant workers decreased, and the number of asylum seeking refugees increased, 
Danish attitudes towards immigrants began to deteriorate (Moore 358).   
In the mid 1980s and early 1990s, the majority of refugees were arriving from the Iran-
Iraq war and the civil wars of Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). 
The rising concern about immigrants was connected to issues of residential segregation and 
social problems. During a parliamentary debate in the early 1980s, a conservative MP was 
quoted as saying that accepting families with “roots in cultures which deviate from the Danish 
[culture]...would...lead to many tragedies for the families in question” (Hagensen qtd. in 
Mouritsen and Olsen 694). The issue was focused on how immigrants were to live on ‘an equal 
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footing’, given the differences in cultures (Mouritsen and Olsen 694).  In the political sphere, 
immigration/integration was becoming a more prominent issue. The number of voters expressing 
concern about immigration grew from four percent in 1989 to 25 in 1998 (Moore 358). The polls 
indicated, “immigration issues superseded unemployment, taxes and the economy as the single 
most important concern to voters” (Moore 358).  
By this point, Denmark was struggling with rising unemployment rates in the unskilled 
labor and lower-level management sectors due to shifting employment trends resulting from 
globalization (Moore 358). Language barriers and low education levels for immigrants were of 
particular concern (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). Politically, there was still an emphasis on equal 
rights. However, more weight was placed on the “duty of immigrants to make an effort to 
integrate and become economically self-supporting” (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). This marked the 
start of the shift from concern for cultural differences and human rights of immigrants to 
assimilation and integration.  
Moving forward, I will use the words ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ repeatedly. In this 
paper, I interpret integration and assimilation as one in the same. Although by definition they are 
different, the policies and practices concerning integration, which will be later discussed in 
Chapter Two, contain elements of both terms. Brendan O’Leary, author of Right-sizing the State: 
The Politics of Moving Borders, defines assimilation as a process that “seeks to eliminate public 
and private differences between people’s cultures...through fusion or acculturation” (34). 
According to O’Leary, integration “stops at the public domain permitting private cultures to be 
maintained” (34). Although the integration discourse in Denmark was largely public, policies 
such as mother tongue teaching – which will also be discussed later – do interfere with 
immigrants on a private sphere. By discontinuing the teaching of an immigrant’s native language 
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on the stance that Danish should be spoken in the home, the goal is not just integration, but 
assimilation. Ultimately, the policies set forth were not just about active participation and self 
support, but also about complete cultural adoption.  
By the mid-1990s, immigration and integration in particular were salient within the 
political sphere. In 1999, the Social Democratic government introduced an ‘integration law’. 
This law aimed to “contribute to the newly arrived foreigner’s possibility for participating on an 
equal footing with other citizens (“borgere”) in the political, economic, work-related, social, 
religious and cultural life of society’; to induce economic self-reliance and to provide the 
‘individual foreigner [with] and understanding of the fundamental values and norms of the 
Danish society” (Integration Law, article 1, qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen 694–695). More 
humanitarian aims, such as “ensuring equal rights and opportunities and promoting a society of 
mutual respect, were deliberately excluded from the law” (Mouritsen and Olsen 695). The 1999 
integration law also included the following dictates:   
• Mandatory three-year integration programs in order to obtain permanent residency  
• Family reunification eligibility only available to people with permanent residency status 
were eligible to apply for family-reunification of relatives  
• Lower ‘introduction benefit’ for refugees  
• Possible of repatriation of welfare-dependent and non-permanent residents  
• Tougher demands on refugees (including a duty to remain in a designated municipality 
for the first three years in Denmark) to make them whole persons.  (Mouritsen and Olsen 
695) 
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In its “Concluding Observations” address to Denmark in 2000, The Human Rights 
Committee found issue with Denmark’s enforcement of Articles 3 and 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Committee noted the following:  
• The Committee is concerned about reports of discrimination against ethnic minorities. 
The Committee recommends that measures be taken to prevent such discrimination (3). 
• The Committee notes that asylum-seekers in Denmark are often restricted or discouraged 
from choosing a place of residence in specific municipalities or from moving from one 
municipality to another. Denmark should ensure that any such measures are applied in 
strict compliance with article 12 of the Covenant (4). 
• [As per Article 13 of the ICCPR], the Committee notes that asylum-seekers are entitled to 
have the assistance of legal counsel. The state party should provide information as to the 
stages of the application procedures at which legal assistance may be had, and whether 
the assistance is free of charge at all stages for those who cannot afford it (4). 
These dictates also violated Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
states, “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
state” (“United Nations. General Assembly”). Altogether, these policies reversed the 1983 
immigration law, and also marked the beginning of a series of immigration laws that were to 
come in the immediate years (Mouritsen and Olsen 695). The demand that refugees stay in a 
designated municipality for three years, as part of an effort to make them “whole persons” 
(Mouritsen and Olsen 695), is not only restrictive but also repressive.  
 
  
 
Anderson 20 
Far-Right Populism in Denmark  
Right-wing populism has long existed in Denmark. In fact, the country became famous 
for having the strongest right-wing populist party in the continent in the early 1970s. This party 
was the Progress Party, which came to power in 1973 – the same year as the oil crisis. Notably, 
the emergence of “guest workers” in the 1960s did not create an uproar about immigration 
(Rydgren 474). This was therefore a non-issue in the party’s political policy. Though far right, 
the Progress Party was largely a “tax-populist, anti-bureaucracy, protest party” (Rydgren 474). 
Denmark’s first far-right party was the Danish People’s Party (DPP), which was founded in 1995 
as a breakaway from the Danish Progress Party (Rydgren 480).  
Far-right parties rose in popularity because of the deep division in sentiments concerning 
membership in the European Union (EU), along with a “significant distrust” of and alienation 
from politicians and government institutions in general. These attitudes stemmed from a deep 
disappointment with the conservative government’s rule and their handling of the country’s new 
taxation policies (Moore 359). The burden of taxes, rising levels of unemployment and shifting 
employment trends gave rise to increased economic inequality, insecurity and unfavorable 
attitudes towards immigrants. These factors “produced a deterioration of class and political party 
identification, and opened the door even further to the far right” (Moore 359).  
It is worth noting that immigration was not the DPP’s initial platform for emerging on the 
political sphere. Rather, its platform was the opposition to taxation and the increasingly high 
rates of taxation in the welfare state (Moore 357). Increased immigration simply furthered 
citizens’ mistrust of the government and led the Danes to support their more radically right and 
anti-establishment parties (Kestilä and Söderlund qtd. in Moore 358). Following the DPP’s 
significant rise in popularity, the party maintained its position by bringing immigration issues to 
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the forefront, and then by keeping these issues on top of electoral agendas, in order to further 
influence new “rightward drift” of Danish politics. Central to the DPP’s message was the point 
that immigration was a threat to Danish culture, as illustrated in the following message:  
Denmark is not a country of immigration, and has never been one. We cannot 
therefore accept a multiethnic transformation of the country. Denmark is a 
country of Danes, and its citizens should be granted the opportunity to live in a 
safe community founded on the rule of law which is evolving in line with Danish 
culture...The Danish People’s Party is in favour of cultural cooperation with other 
countries, but we are against giving other cultures, building on completely 
different values and norms than ours, leverage in Denmark. The way of life we 
have chosen in Denmark is outstanding. It is conditioned by our culture, and in a 
small country like ours it cannot survive if we permit mass immigration of foreign 
religions and foreign cultures. A multicultural society is a society without 
coherence and unity, and, consequently, existing multicultural societies over the 
globe are characterized by a lack of solidarity and often by open conflict, as well. 
There are no good reasons to assume that Denmark would escape the destiny of 
other multicultural societies if we let ourselves under the sway of foreign cultures 
(Den Danske Foreing qtd. in Rydgren 484).  
  As cheap immigrant labor continued to be replaced by a sharp increase in asylum seeking 
refugees, the rising anti-immigration sentiment in Denmark increased, with the formation of 
organizations such as the Committee against the Refugee Law, founded in 1984 (and considered 
the first anti-immigration organization in Denmark) and the Danish Association, founded in 
1987. The message of the Danish Association was very similar to the DPP’s. The DPP’s message 
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concerned the desire to “secure Danish culture, language and mode of life in a world threatened 
by chaos, violence and fanaticism...[while warning against] the disintegration of [Danish] culture 
and popular unity, which is caused by an influx of people from overpopulated countries” (Den 
Danske Forening, qtd. in Rydgren 481).   
In reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Danish Association 
claimed “the right of the peoples of Western Europe...to their own households and their own 
resources, [noting] the fundamental principle that nobody has the right to force one’s way into 
another country at the expense of the peoples of that country” (Den Danske Forening qtd. in 
Rydgren 481). Going even further, the organization’s ideology was akin to that of the French far-
right wing party, Le Front National. In a firm display of its stance against immigration, the 
organization was centered on the following ideology:  
When a foreign culture is pressed on another country, there will be a shower of 
sparks. Those who today are intruding [on] our country do not want to become 
‘integrated’. They are too many. And experiences from other European countries, 
which have had mass migration for a long time, show us what will happen: 
disturbances, violence and conflicts (Den Danske Foreing qtd. in Rydgren 482).  
The Danish Association’s message addressed their concerns about foreign cultures and 
religions; of which, the most vilified was Islam. Focusing on Muslims in a further effort to 
rationalize its stance against immigration, the Danish Association said, “The majority of the 
immigrants have another view of life than we have. For most Muslims there is no equality for 
women and people of other religions. And the supreme law is not the one that is stipulated by our 
democratic institutions, but Allah’s law, the Koran. The order they will try to implement here – 
when they are many enough” (Den Danske Forening qtd. in Rydgren 482).  
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The concept of ‘cultural anxiety’ (Grillo qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2311) contextualizes 
why foreigners (particularly Muslims) may be perceived as threats (Rytter and Pedersen 2311). 
“Cultural anxiety is directed at external transgressors2…or local ‘enemies within’, such as the 
immigrant population, which personifies the disturbing forces of globalization, transformation 
and change” (Rytter and Pedersen 2311–2312). Most noticeable in the public and political 
discourse, this concept was heavily articulated and promoted by the DPP (Rytter and Pedersen 
2311) as another component of their anti-immigration rhetoric. 
The subsequent growth in public anti-immigration sentiment was certainly a factor in the 
DPP’s win of the 2001 general election, which was dubbed the immigration election. With a 
clear stance on immigrants, it was not surprising that the new ruling party would strongly 
espouse its liberal-conservative values, which would ultimately help to usher in policies and 
practices aimed at tightening immigration. In a series of steadily increasing conditions and 
regulations, which will be discussed in Chapter Two, the Danish populous witnessed a seismic 
shift in the Danish integration and immigration policy, with added constraints on access to 
permanent residency or Danish citizenship, with added stringency for Muslim immigrants.   
Overall, the pattern of Danish resistance to varying cultures and religions reflected 
something that has been deeply embedded in their history. On the one hand, as a contracted state, 
there was a need for security, which was in the comfort of having something “distinctly Danish” 
to maintain the spirit of the nation. However, the framing of immigrants as threats and their 
immediate association with violence, social unrest and the loss of social and cultural cohesion 
also led to immigrants being portrayed as the cause of destabilization in an otherwise stable state. 
The point is there is no true stability in a recently contracted state. The country’s sense of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2Rytter and Pedersen define “external transgressors” as the international economy, the European Union (EU), the 
Human Rights Charter or the United Nations (2311–2312).	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national identity needed to be rebuilt and restored at that time. However, by portraying 
immigrants as risks, it was easier to associate immigrants with destabilization and destruction, 
and blame them for the country’s socio-economic problems – even though the Danish nation was 
anything but ideal. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Citizenship Policies: Creating ‘Good Citizens’ 
“The more alike we are, the easier it is to sustain the idea of equality. To be equal in Danish 
society, thus tend[s] to imply to be similar” 
(Johncke 2007 and Hervik 1999 qtd. in Jensen et al. 5) 
  
Denmark’s accolades for its system of government and enforcement of human rights 
internationally have not dispelled the fact that immigration is still a challenge for the state. 
Despite the religious shifts to the formerly Christian state over the years, the Grudtvigian 
ideology remained central to the Danish identity. With its emphasis on Danish poetry, history 
and culture, Grundtvigism became embedded into the fiber of the nation’s being – thus 
informing its national identity. Grudtvigian teaching was not just about spirituality, but also 
about nationality – which very strongly influenced Danish customs. This notion of “Danishness” 
is therefore quite impactful, especially on issues relating to assimilation and acculturation; and 
they could explain the immigration issues present for Muslims, as well as the social perceptions 
of Muslim minorities and whether or not they fit the definition of a  “good citizen.” Considering 
these factors as a conceptual foundation for understanding the immigration and integration 
policies in Denmark, this chapter will examine how they have been modified to affect 
immigrants and cultural minorities.  
  
Integration as Assimilation: The Creation of the ‘Good Citizen’           
From Chapter One, we know that the 1980s marked the start of integration becoming a 
significant political issue – leading to the creation of a 1983 immigration law – which was then 
effectively reversed with the 1999 immigration law. The new law also marked the start of further 
systematic changes in Denmark’s immigration and integration policies. The Danish immigration 
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law comprised of two main features: the Aliens Act and the Integration Act. “The Aliens Act 
addressed foreigners’ legal status in Denmark concerning [circumstances such as]...entry and 
residence permits (temporary and permanent). The Integration Act concerned the actual process 
of integration [for]…refugees and family reunification of refugees and immigrants from its 
inception until 2010 – after which further changes came into effect (Jensen et al. 3).  
Analysts from the Danish Center for Social Research (SFI) identified the objective of the 
Integration Act as, “to ensure that newly arrived foreigners are given the possibility of using their 
abilities and resources to become involved as contributing citizens on equal footing with other 
citizens of Danish society” (Jensen et al. 4). This, the researchers say, must be done via an 
“effort of integration” (Jensen et al. 4). One of the objectives listed under the Integration Act 
pertains to the imparting of “the fundamental values and norms of the Danish society” 
(Integration Act qtd. in Jensen et al.). The act also emphasized the importance of “making newly 
arrived foreigners self-supporting as quickly as possible through employment” (Jensen, et al. 4) 
as well as ensuring that immigrants can function in the political, economic, social and religious 
spheres “on an equal footing with other citizens” (Jensen et al. 4). Based on these objectives, 
researchers from SFI concluded, “The notion of equality is central to the Integration Act and in 
the integration policy as such. However, the concept of equality is closely related to a perception 
that equality requires a certain degree of sameness…” thus making the law somewhat 
contradictory (Jensen et al.5).  This analysis explains why I define integration and assimilation, 
in the Danish, context as one in the same. 
Despite the recommendations from the Human Rights Committee in 2000, the criteria for 
gaining access to citizenship was further tightened in 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2008 (Mouritsen and 
Olsen 699).  In 2002, the government implemented what was recognized as the strictest rule in 
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the world at the time (Schmidt qtd. in Fernandez and Jensen 1140). The government reintroduced 
the lower ‘introduction benefit’ (first presented in the 1999 immigration law) for new immigrants 
entering the program as well as “lower ‘start help’ payments for those unemployed (including 
Danish citizens) who had not spent seven of the previous eight years in Denmark” (Mouritsen 
and Olsen 698). In 2005, ‘integration contracts’, which were to be signed by immigrants, were 
also introduced. These contracts “specified increased obligations (attending language school, 
active job seeking) as conditions for financial support...” (Mouritsen and Olsen 698). Later, “the 
legal right to family reunification was withdrawn and a controversial twenty-four year rule 
(requiring both the Danish-resident spouse and the new immigrant to be at least twenty-four 
years old for residency to be granted) in order to prevent forced (and arranged marriages) and to 
reduce the number of immigrants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds” (Mouritsen and 
Olsen 698).  
Going even further, the criteria for gaining access to citizenship also included the following:  
• Residence requirement of nine years  
• A loyalty affirmation  
• A written citizenship test without publicized questions that can be practiced beforehand  
• A stiff language requirement (minimum grade D (ECTS) in level 3 Danish test  
• Tough restrictions and waiting periods in case of previous welfare dependency, public 
debts or criminal offenses.  (Mouritsen and Olsen, 699)  
  In keeping with the Danish focus on integration and assimilation, the required citizenship 
test included questions that tested immigrants’ knowledge of Danish national culture by asking 
trivia questions related to sports, such as football championships. The test included questions on 
high culture (testing knowledge of painters and authors) and early national history (e.g., the 
introduction of Christianity in Denmark). The language test also exceeded the typical 
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‘functional’ competence needed for the labor market and political participation and instead tested 
for a level of language competence that “many non-Western immigrants, especially the lower 
educated, [would] not be able to reach” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). Finally, in what Mouritsen 
and Olsen describe as a conspicuous act, Denmark rejected dual citizenship, but provided 
“special fast-track naturalization procedures for ‘culturally close’ applicants from Nordic 
countries and northern Germany” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700).   
None of these changes amounted to those implemented in the amendment of the 
Integration Law in 2010. One added stipulation was that ‘successful integration’ was a condition 
for obtaining a permanent residence permit (Jensen et al. 5). Although the term ‘successful 
integration’ was neither used nor defined in the Integration Act, researchers from the SFI assert 
that the wording of the act suggests that ‘successful integration’ is “apparently measured by 
educational performance, fast acquisition of Danish language skills, integration into the labour-
market, economic self-reliance and active participation in society” (Jensen et al. 6).   
In 2010, “the rules on access to (and forfeit of) permanent residency” were further 
tightened, with “the introduction of a required sustained course in Danish society, culture and 
history” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). In the same year, the minimum required years for residence 
before being eligible for permanent residence was reduced from seven years to four years; 
however a point system for immigrants was subsequently introduced (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). 
This point system allowed for immigrants to earn permanent residence only if they met the 
increased requirements of  “labor market activity and language scores, with points added for 
active citizenship (i.e., voluntary work in schools and local associations)” (Mouritsen and Olsen 
700).  
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According to Mouritsen and Olsen, the citizenship policies (especially those outlined in 
the revamped 2010 Integration Law) were designed to “pressure or motivate immigrants into 
becoming model citizens before they achieve actual citizen status (naturalization) and even 
before they earn the right to permanent residence” (698). Essentially, not only were the policies 
designed to force integration/assimilation, but also to serve as “civic-screening and exclusion 
devices” such that some people could not, and would not, become members of the Danish 
society (Mouritsen and Olsen 698). For immigrants, being a model Danish citizen entailed being 
self supporting, having or acquiring knowledge of Danish values, and also participating in 
society – all for their own benefit (Mouritsen and Olsen 695). These requirements revealed who 
could and could not meet the demands, resulting in a line being drawn between ‘the good’ and 
‘the bad’ foreigners (Jensen et al. 6).  
With the plethora of changes in the Danish immigration policy, a new type of societal 
membership emerged, described as a “two-tier membership” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). 
Effectively, either one was a societal ‘citizen’ or a full citizen. In “Denmark Between Liberalism 
and Nationalism,” Mouritsen and Olsen define societal ‘citizenship’ as being made available for 
those who can  “integrate well in terms of work, active participation, and significant cultural 
knowledge and adaptation” (700). They define full citizenship as having “a Danish passport, 
including rights to fully participate politically, move freely across EU and other borders, and 
receive social transfers without implications for one’s rights to stay” (700). The rights, Mouritsen 
and Olsen say, “remain privileges for an even more select inner circle” (700).  
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The Danish Philosophy of Integration  
Though the measures implemented by the Danish government may seem harsh, they 
serve as stark reminders of Danish history and the principles upon which Danish nationalism was 
built. Besides homogeneity, embedded in the cultural fiber of Denmark are the remnants of 
Christian, Lutheran and Grundtvigian principles. The four other elements that are arguably some 
of the driving forces behind the Danish philosophy of integration are: Christianity, emphasis on 
the Danish language, pride in the welfare society and Lutheranism.  
Although Denmark is considered a secular state, the role of religion in society remains 
significant. According to the Constitutional Act of Denmark (The Danish Constitution, section 
4), the Evangelical Lutheran Church, also known as the People’s Church (Folkekirken), is the 
established church of Denmark (Rytter and Pedersen 2311; Mouritsen and Olsen 696). Known as 
the state’s church since its integration into the state during the years of the protestant 
reformation, the church still enjoys a “privileged position in cultural life” (Mouritsen and Olsen 
696), as it is “governed and financed by the state, from the Ministry of Ecclesiastical 
Affairs” (Rytter and Pedersen 2311). “Protestantism still tends to play a significant role in 
various settings, from the annual ritual opening of parliament (Folketinget), to the Queen’s New 
Year’s speech and [most importantly] the state school (folkeskole) curriculum” (Rytter and 
Pedersen 2311). Moreover, as of April 2015, the national website of Denmark still lists its 
national religion as 90% Protestant (“Facts and Statistics”).           
Given Denmark’s history with language (as propagated by Grundtvig), “mastery and 
public (or even private) use of the Danish language remains a strong parameter of national 
belonging both socially and legally, over the ‘functional’ considerations of both public 
communication and labor market flexibility” (Mouritsen and Olsen 696). Thirdly, “the smallness, 
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cultural homogeneity and tight-knit ‘cosiness’ of Danish society” stemming back to the loss of 
the war with Germany, along with the “homogenizing process through schools and monopoly 
television” are still part of the larger discourse on “national cohesion, the valuation of sameness 
and the mistrust of cultural pluralism...” (Mouritsen and Olsen 696–697).  
The fourth thing to note is the “pride in the welfare society (not state)” in which solidarity 
is conditioned on working and paying taxes, provided that one is not “sick, handicapped, retired 
or temporarily unemployed” (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). Lastly, “Lutheranism remains 
significant” (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). The Grundtvigian-Lutheran ideology not only 
“challenges citizens to struggle for all that you hold dear” (Richardt qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen 
697), but also teaches them to “tolerate, with both goodwill and confrontation, the belief of 
others” (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). These policies became integral to the government’s approach 
to immigration and integration policies. For Muslims, this was particularly problematic. Despite 
the decline in traditional religiosity, discourses of ‘cultural Christianity’ and ‘Lutheran 
individualism’ have recycled some of the elements above in a manner which places Islam in an 
unfavorable light (Mouritsen and Olsen, 697), thus presenting further immigration and 
integration problems for Muslim immigrants and minorities, respectively.  
  
Revisiting the Historic Danish Rescue of Jews During the Holocaust 
The problems currently present for the Muslim minority are not unlike those experienced 
by Jews who had previously settled in Denmark in the 1930s. Close examination of the climate 
in Denmark at the time reveals stark similarities in the domestic experiences of Jews then and 
Muslims today. The following analysis reveals that like Muslims, Jews were stereotyped, they 
faced criticism because of their religious beliefs, they were subjected to strict immigration 
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restrictions, and were more likely to be accepted if they were assimilated (i.e., they spoke 
Danish, dressed like Danes and conformed to socio-cultural norms). The analysis shows the 
depth to which Danish culture has influenced its policies and practices. This does not mean 
culture is the only influencing factor, but it is certainly a significant one. 
Despite the popular representations of the brighter side of Danish history – which 
includes the story of the rescue and safe smuggling of Danish Jews into Sweden, as protection 
from Nazi forces during the Holocaust – a dark undertone also existed within the Danish model 
of humanism towards Jews, particularly Jewish refugees in the 1930s. Before the 1940 German 
occupation of Denmark, Danish policies towards Jewish immigrants were not very different from 
those of other European countries at the time. Entrance visas were “strictly limited,” and some 
German Jewish refugees were stopped at the border and “sent home to their deaths” (Buckser 2). 
Though these instances were reduced during the German occupation, they still happened. As 
case in point, 21 stateless Jewish refugees were expelled to Germany between 1940 and 1943. 
They were neither ordered nor demanded by German occupiers, but were nonetheless sent to 
their deaths after living in Denmark for a number of years (Vilhjálmsson and Blüdnikow, 
“Rescue, Expulsion, and Collaboration”). Although there are no clear details as to why this was 
done, it is evident that anti-Semitism was very much alive in Denmark.  
 Another thing to note is that for three years (1940–1943), Denmark put up with the 
German occupation based on something known as the negotiations policy or Forhandlingspolitik 
(Voorhis, 173). This resulted in Denmark regarded as Germany’s Musterprotektortat (model 
protectorate) or ‘Hitler’s Canary,’ as Winston Churchill dubbed it (Friedman 318). There were 
very minimal signs of resistance on the part of the Danish people, as this policy reduced the 
number of Danish casualties (Voorhis 173). Further examination of the reasons behind the 
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Danish rescue of Jews incites speculation on Danish humanitarianism as it relates to their 
motivation for assisting Jews, especially when there were indications of anti-Semitic sentiments 
within the country. 
There were notably high levels of assimilation for Jews living in Denmark from the 
1600s.  Danish Jews at the time spoke Danish, they dressed like other Danes, and they 
participated actively in the social and cultural life of the nation (Buckser 9).  Danish Jews also 
enjoyed full civil rights since 1814. However, their assimilation meant that – unlike today’s 
Muslims – Danish Jews had a stronger identification with larger Danish culture and were (to 
some extent) accepted as such.  
During the state’s economic disaster in 1813, anti-Semitic sentiments became more 
apparent as Jews were considered responsible for the nation’s bankruptcy, and were portrayed in 
the media as “parasitic and alien to the Danish nation” (Wagner 154). Although an 1814 law 
against racial and religious discrimination protected these immigrants, there was still opposition 
to the official acceptance of Jews into Danish society. At the assemblies of the Estate in the 
1830s and 1840s, there were strong opinions against furthering the rights of Jews on a 
“combination of ethic[al] and religious grounds [such as the notion that]...Jews could never 
become Danes, because the core of being Danish was Christianity and the essence [of] being 
Jewish was to belong to that nation alien to the Danish people” (Wagner 154).   
After the re-stabilization of the Danish economy and the successful full emancipation of 
Jews in 1848–49, due to activism (Wagner 154), there were post-emancipation conflicts that led 
to Jews being associated with “individualistic hedonism, materialistic capitalism, radical 
skepticism and anticlerical liberalism,” which was aimed at destroying the “organically grown 
Christian state” (Wagner 156). This statement, made by a Bishop named Hans Lassen 
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Martensen, was in reference to the “assimilated and emancipated Jewry,” who he felt were the 
“primary force undermining the concept of the Christian nation state” (Wagner 155). The 
ongoing debate surrounding Jewish integration continued – reaching a critical level in the 1870s. 
Described as the “critical transition period” (Wagner 156), there was now a “bridge between 
anti-emancipationist concepts of the first half of the nineteenth century and the rearticulation of 
anti-Jewish stereotyping since the late nineteenth century” (Wagner 156–157).  
Years later, between 1901 and 1917, a new wave of immigrants from Russia and other 
Eastern European countries immigrated to the county. These Jews, on the other hand, spoke 
Yiddish and had trouble mastering the Danish language; their mode of dress differed from 
Danish styles; their Jewish practice was more orthodox than the ‘reform-influenced Danish 
Jews’, they had little to no income; and, overall, they were easily distinguishable3 (qtd. in 
Buckser 9–10). “Since the immigrants had to walk to services on the Sabbath, they soon formed 
a small immigrant slum in the cramped streets surrounding the synagogue. This new group was 
very visible, and its image soon came to dominate public perceptions of Jews in Denmark” (9). 
From there, caricatures of Jews in Danish newspapers began to appear, portraying Jews as 
“...dark, bearded men in Eastern European dress,” thus upsetting native Jews (Buckser 9). In 
response to the caricatures, several comments were made, such as, “[they] used to see us as 
Danes of Mosaic faith, but now they look at us as Jews!” (Blum qtd. in Buckser 10).  
Given the aforementioned examples, it is therefore quite plausible that the need to 
safeguard the interest of the Danish state was the primary driver in the resistance to the Nazi 
invasion. After all, Denmark was willing to make concessions with the Germans for three years, 
while she was occupied by the Nazis to “keep her own parliamentary system, the monarchy, and 
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  Buckser notes that this description of the immigrants is based primarily on Pinches Weiner, Fra polskjode til dansk 
(Copenhagen: Hasselbach, 1965); Bludnikow, Immigranter; Melchior, A Rabbi Remembers; Blum, Dansk og/eller 
Jode; Benjamin Balslev, De Danske Joders Historie (Copenhagen: Lohse, 1932); and Bamberger, Viking Jews.  	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a degree of constitutional liberty...This ability to maintain her independence and prevent a 
German or Nazi take-over resulted partly from the Danish government’s policy of cooperation 
and non-resistance” (Voorhis 173). Of course, there were other factors, such as the strength of 
the German military. Nonetheless, up until this point, the only Danish resistance to the German 
occupation pertained to issues which would alter the political structure of Denmark, such as 
blocking the increasing push from Germans for Danish support of the economic development of 
German-held areas in the Soviet Union, blocking the German push for a Quisling-type 
government (Voorhis 176).  If there was not a threat to the Danish way of life and belief system, 
there may have been no famous historical WWII achievement of which to speak.   
Overall, the newer integration/assimilation requirements appeared to be more extensive 
and stringent, but their intent was the same – to achieve the greatest level of 
assimilation/integration and to uphold and protect the Danish national culture. What is different, 
however, is the context through which the policies were created, and the way the minority 
reacted to them. What is clear is that there was a focus on maintaining a culturally homogeneous 
society by controlling who is best positioned to receive permanent residence or citizenship, based 
on “cultural closeness.” This exclusivity transcends nationalism and extends to xenophobia. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Intersection Between Immigration, Integration and Security 
  
2001 is an important year in Danish history for several reasons: 2001 was the year of the 
September 11 (9/11) attacks against the United States, and it marked the first of a 10-year rule of 
Denmark by the far-right wing political party, DPP. The DPP succeeded in the state elections, 
two months after the 9/11 attacks, which was a critical event that sent shockwaves through the 
American nation, and other parts of the world. In Denmark, 9/11 aided the DPP’s push for more 
stringent immigration and integration policies. What followed is what I call the 9/11 effect, 
which was a rise in Islamophobia, and a subsequent immigration policy that was overall 
restrictive but also slightly more disadvantageous to Muslim immigrants, who were seen as 
possible threats to the country.  
The 9/11 attacks heightened the already salient debate on immigration, while also 
merging these issues with “concerns of national security and the potential threat of Muslims both 
inside and outside of Denmark” (Olwig and Paerregaard, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2306). The 
measures employed to tackle both the immigration and security concerns became known as the 
‘security/integration response’. These actions ushered in a period that Mikkel Rytter and 
Marianne Holm Pedersen call “a decade of suspicion,” especially towards Muslims who became 
cast as “the usual suspects” in society (Rytter and Pedersen 2303).    
This chapter discusses Rytter and Pedersen’s suggestion that the policies and practices 
enforced against Muslim immigrants are not just because of Denmark’s historical, political and 
cultural processes towards immigration and integration. Instead, they assert that these factors 
merged with 9/11 as a global factor and joined with the European adoption of a 
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security/integration response, subsequently producing what they refer to as a “distinctly ‘Danish’ 
version of a much broader phenomenon” (2309).       
  
Understanding Securitization  
9/11 signaled the beginning of changes in security policies, hence ushering a series of 
new laws and policies, as well as “altering notions of identity, belonging and day to day relations 
between majorities and minorities in various countries around the world” (Rytter and Pedersen 
2305). European countries embarked on a process known as ‘securitization’, which is defined as 
“the process where something (a referent object) is deemed threatened and security actions are 
taken in its defense” (Lausten and Wæver, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2305). Through 
securitization, European countries also introduced “far-reaching pre-emptive policies and 
legislation to protect the states and citizens against “religiously motivated terrorism” (Rytter and 
Pedersen 2305).    
After 9/11, there was a noticeable shift in the perception and conceptualization of ethnic 
and religious minorities in Denmark (Rytter and Pedersen 2306). This shift was more apparent 
for Muslims. An “essentialist understanding” of Islam emerged, highlighting Muslim militant 
groups, while casting a shadow on the religious faith and practices of the world’s Muslims. For 
many politicians, commentators and European citizens, Islam became seen as being “opposed to 
democracy, equal rights and freedom of speech” (Cesari qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2303) and 
Muslims were seen as potential internal enemies because of their difference in ideology. This 
resulted in debates and politics regarding Muslim immigrants as needing new and heightened 
security dimensions.    
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As part of the ‘security’ component of the security/integration response, a Ministry of 
Integration was created “in order to deal with the urgent political questions concerning 
immigrants and refugees in Danish society” (Olwig and Paerregaad, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 
2307). There was “increased control, surveillance and regulation of Muslim immigrant families 
already living in Denmark” (Rytter and Pedersen 2307). There were also increased barriers to 
entry into Denmark, as the criteria for being granted permanent residency as a refugee were 
changed, resulting in a plummet in accepted refugees to Denmark from 5,211 in 2001 to 233 in 
2007 (Rytter and Pedersen 2307).  
  
Understanding Integration  
Following the adoption and implementation of securitization initiatives, the Danish 
government began revisiting its integration policies and implementing several changes, some of 
which were already discussed in the “Integration as Assimilation” section of Chapter Two. 
Another major change, not yet discussed, was the abolition of mother tongue teaching in 2002, 
which “up until that point, had been obligatory and was provided to children with an immigrant 
background” (Rytter and Pedersen 2308). Despite international research findings stating that 
“bilingual students perform better in education if they are fluent in both Danish and their native 
language…the argument was that children – in the name of integration – should speak Danish at 
home” (Holmen qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2308). “Subsidies paid to immigrant associations 
were [also] significantly reduced” (Rytter and Pedersen 2308).  
 “While immigrant, cultural and religious associations had formally been encouraged as a 
means of enhanced engagement in civil society in the wake of 9/1,1 these groups were monitored 
and controlled and, to a large extent, regarded as suspect” (Rytter and Pedersen 2308). 
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According to Rytter and Pedersen, “while [the Danish response to] the war on terror was, at first, 
an immediate reaction to an extreme situation, it later became normalized as an obvious aspect of 
the resort and jurisdiction of the nation state” (Andersen qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2308). 
Essentially, “the reconstruction of Muslim immigrants as a potential enemy within became an 
almost permanent, naturalized condition” (Rytter and Pedersen 2309).   
This transformation of the Muslim image into being a threat to the Danish nation and its 
values was most evident in Denmark’s change in its citizenship policies; which made the 
possibility of Muslim immigrants being part of Danish society far more difficult. The citizenship 
policies required immigrant applicants to “pass a test on Danish history, culture and society”...as 
well as sign a “declaration in which they swear allegiance and loyalty to Denmark and Danish 
society, and declare their willingness to observe and respect the national laws” (Rytter and 
Pederson 2308). “Denmark also started to select the refugees making up its United Nations (UN) 
quota on the basis of so-called ‘integration potential’. In practice, this meant that more Christian 
refugees were granted residency at the expense of refugees with a Muslim background” (Whyte 
qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2307).   
  
Immigration, Securitization and Integration  
The rapid decrease in the number of accepted refugees to Denmark after 9/11 was due in 
large part to the Aliens Act which was enacted in 2002, as part of an agreement between the 
Danish government and the DPP. The Aliens Act facilitated the abolition of the de facto concept, 
which was replaced by the protection status or status B concept, which limited Denmark’s role in 
receiving immigrants only to its obligatory human rights convention requirements  (Kjær 255). 
In what was an unambiguous departure from its long history of having more favorable policies 
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towards refugees and asylum seekers, this change was in keeping with the desire to reduce the 
number of foreigners entering Denmark, and to implement stricter requirements in order to help 
facilitate faster integration.   
The de facto concept was part of the 1983 immigration law. Its goal was to protect people 
who fell outside of the definition of “refugee,”4 as stipulated by the 1951 Refugee Convention 
(Kjær). In addition to ‘traditional’ refugees, who fled their native countries because of the threat 
of persecution or lack of protection, the Danish de facto concept also applied to migrants who 
fled their country to avoid active war service “republic refugees,”5 and migrants whose cases 
provided insufficient evidence to support their claims for applying for citizenship. This particular 
provision was justified using the “general acknowledged principle of international asylum law 
relating to benefit of the doubt” (Kjær 255). The change meant that asylum seekers and refugee 
applicants would be assessed based on international covenants. The status B concept guarantees 
protection to those who are protected under the 1951 Convention. It also protects persons who 
risk ‘being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,’ as well as 
“foreigners risking the death penalty,” which is included in the sixth article of European 
Convention of Human Rights (Kjær 256).  
Denmark’s amended refugee and asylum changes were most harmful to asylum seekers 
from Afghanistan and Iran. Kim Kjær, Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute for Human 
Rights, asserts that Danish administrative initiatives were launched at Afghan and Iranian asylum 
seekers when, for a brief period of time, Danish officials decided to “suspend the processing of 
applications for asylum from Afghan nationals” (Kjær 268). This occurred despite their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4“When the provision on de facto status was introduced in The 1983 Act, the relevant persons received a proper 
legal claim to reside as refugees in Denmark as ‘de facto refugees’ on more or less the same terms as convention[al] 	  
refugees” (Kjær 256).	  
5These were ‘refugees’ “from the former eastern bloc countries who, if they returned, risked violent reprisals merely 
because they had stayed for a long period and/or applied for asylum in a Western country” (Kjær 256).	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recognition as refugees, in order to “procure new updated background information on the 
situation in the country” (Kjær 268). According to Kjær, the hope was that the situation in 
Afghanistan would improve, reducing the number of asylum seeker applications (268).   
Whatever the reasons, it is quite possible that Denmark’s actions were in violation of 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states “everyone has the right to 
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (“United Nations. General 
Assembly”). As a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Denmark is obligated to uphold the 
duties and principles set forth within the Convention. Although the state may reject an asylum 
application, the choice to halt the processing of applications from a distinct region can also be 
seen as a violation of Article 3, Section 4 of the	  Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on 
Minimum Guarantees for Asylum Procedures. More specifically, it could be said that Denmark’s 
actions violated the stipulation that “[d]ecisions will be taken independently in the sense that all 
asylum applications will be examined and decided upon individually, objectively and 
impartially” (“Council Resolution of June 20 1995”). The act of suspending the asylum 
applicants of Afghan immigrants denied them the right to an impartial and objective 
examination, as well as their right to seek asylum as stated by the Council Resolution and 
UDHR, respectively. 
 
When History, Politics and Culture Collide: The Danish Cartoon Controversy  
The image of Islam “as a dangerous and threatening religion…has been a concern that 
has, in various ways, been part of European history and identity since the expansion of the 
Ottoman Empire” (Said qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2309). One notable instance of an Islamic 
uprising is what was called the Rushdie affair in 1989, “which mobilized a visible Muslim public 
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in Europe” (Rytter and Pedersen 2309)…[and] created a new enemy of European values, identity 
and sovereignty, as the threat of communism was succeeded by the threat of Islamism” (Hervik; 
Werbner, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2309).  
According to Rytter and Pedersen, Denmark had its own ‘Rushdie affair’ with its cartoon 
controversy in 2005–06 (and again in 2008), which led to a mobilization of Muslims on an 
“unprecedented scale” (2309–2310).6 The Cartoon Controversy concerned the printing of twelve 
caricatures of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad, along with an editorial that “instructed Muslims 
to accept ‘insults, mockery and ridicule’ as necessary aspects of contemporary democracy and 
freedom of speech” in Jyllands-Posten, the country’s largest newspaper (Hervik; Klausen; 
Lindekilde, Mouritsen and Zapata-Barrero qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2309–2310).  
  
Rage Ignited: The Muslim Response to the Cartoon Controversy 
Following the release of the cartoons, there was a large outcry from members of the 
Muslim community, and a push to bring attention to the issue. This uproar was so large, in fact, 
that the Muslim reaction to the cartoon controversy marked the first time since the Thirty Years 
War that a conflict with religious connotations had such an impact in Danish society (Rudling 
76).  Members of the Danish community implemented many initiatives, such as traveling to the 
Middle East to bring international attention to the case and to gather Muslim 
Imams/representatives (Rytter and Pedersen 2310).  
A primary catalyst for the immense Muslim response was Prime Minister Fogh 
Rasmussen’s refusal to meet with eleven ambassadors from Muslim countries who wanted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6In “Denmark as the Big Satan,” Per Anders Rudling outlines the degree of outrage in the Muslim community. He 
notes, “The decision to publish these cartoons outraged some high-profile Islamists within Denmark. 3,500   
Muslims protested on the streets of Copenhagen against the cartoons. A 17-year old Muslim boy was [also] arrested 
for attempting to kill one of the cartoonists” (77).	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discuss “what they considered to be an anti-Islamic campaign” (Rudling 77). The Danish Prime 
Minister and the Danish government also refused to censor the media or compel them to portray 
Muslims in a more positive light on the grounds that the cartoons were being portrayed as 
expressions of freedom of speech” (Rudling 73–74). In his official response to the Muslim 
protesters, Prime Minister Rasmussen said, “the freedom of expression has a wide scope and the 
Danish government has no means of influencing the press. However, Danish legislation prohibits 
acts or expressions of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature” (Larsen and Seidenfaden qtd. in 
Hervik 60).  
For many Muslim protestors, the cartoons were derogatory because they associated the 
Prophet Muhammad with terrorism, thus implying that all Muslims are terrorists (“Questions and 
Answers”). According to Rytter and Pedersen, the larger populous generally viewed the Muslim 
response objections to the cartoons as “inappropriate; instead of being seen as expressions of 
freedom of speech, their positions and protests were framed as threats to the freedom of speech 
and Danish secular society” (2311). This boosted the outrage of Danish Muslims, resulting in 
riots, which led to the deaths of 139 people (not including the deaths of the 146 killed in 
Nigeria), over 800 people injured and over 10,000 unemployed because of political embargoes 
and destroyed buildings, by torching and vandalism (Rudling 76).7 
In further signs of protest, governments like those of Saudi Arabia and Syria, who are not 
otherwise champions of religious freedom, sided with the Danish Muslim community by 
supporting boycotts of Danish goods and also withdrawing their ambassadors from Copenhagen 
(Kimmelman, “A Startling New Lesson in the Power of Imagery”). In solidarity with Jyllands-
Posten and in defense of free speech, European papers republished the cartoons in countries such 
as in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Hungary, New Zealand, Ukraine and Jordan. 
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  The buildings destroyed include European consulates and embassies, Christian churches and fast food restaurants.	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One also appeared in The Philadelphia Inquirer (Kimmelman, “A Startling New Lesson in the 
Power of Imagery”). The images also “spread worldwide via the Web, exacerbating Muslim 
outrage...” (Kimmelman, “A Startling New Lesson in the Power of Imagery”).  
In an interview two years after the publication of the twelve images, Fleming Rose, one 
of the cartoonists responsible for the drawing maintained that his drawings were not 
discriminatory or racist, instead noting that the Muslim response was unjustified. While talking 
to New York Times reporter Michael Kimmelman, Mr. Rose said: 
It was not about mocking a minority but a religious figure, the Prophet, so it was 
blasphemy, not racism. The idea of challenging religious authority led to liberal 
democracy, whereas the singling out of minorities, as minorities, led to Nazism 
and the persecution of the bourgeoisie in Russia. So this distinction is crucial to 
understand. (Kimmelman, “Outrage at Cartoons Still Tests the Danes”)  
Kimmelman, in another interview with Kurt Westergaard, a cartoonist responsible for 
one of the drawings of the prophet Muhammad, asked him if he went too far with the drawing. In 
response, Westergaard said, “Looking back, perhaps I should have made a cartoon that did not 
use the yellow star.” Kimmelman then asked, “But then why Muhammad and not a star?” and 
Westergaard replied, “Because millions of Jews died in camps wearing that star” (Kimmelman, 
“Outrage at Cartoons Still Tests the Danes”). 
After referencing Prime Minister Rasmussen’s speech, in which he cited Danish law as 
prohibiting acts or expressions of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature (Larsen and 
Seidenfaden qtd. in Hervik 60), one may question why there was no government intervention on 
behalf of Muslims, on the grounds of blasphemy. Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that 
countries with blasphemy laws rarely enforce them, and in general these laws usually protect 
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religions such as Christianity and Judaism. Noting the inconsistencies between offensive speech 
that is criminalized (for Christians and Jews) and tolerated (for Muslims), HRW acknowledges 
the existence of a “clearly discriminatory practice [that] raises legitimate questions about double 
standards” (“Questions and Answers”).  
According to Human Rights Watch, Mr. Rose and Mr. Westergaard were within their 
rights of freedom of expression, since the cartoons are not considered “hate speech.” Hate 
speech “constitutes imminent incitement to unlawful acts of discrimination, hostility or 
violence” (“Questions and Answers”). In the case of Danish Muslims, “the main complaint 
against the cartoons is that is that they offend Islam, not that they have inspired acts of violence, 
criminal harassment or tangible discrimination against Danish or other Muslims” (“Questions 
and Answers”). Human rights law states that, “[s]peech that targets a religion for disrespect, as 
opposed to speech that targets believers for unlawful acts, is protected, however offensive it may 
be” (“Questions and Answers”).  Therefore, Muslims do not have the right, under international 
human rights, law to “…censor the expression of others in the name of their own religious 
freedom” (“Questions and Answers”). 
Although the twelve cartoons are not legally considered hate speech, I suspect that the 
images were nonetheless impactful and particularly offensive, not just because they made fun of 
the prophet Muhammad, but also because its satire associated the prophet with violence and 
terrorism (which, some may argue, implies that Muslims are also terrorists). It is also worth 
considering that Denmark was cited for reports of discrimination against ethnic minorities in the 
past.8 Furthermore, in a post-9/11 world, cartoons simply suggesting Islamic terrorism may have 
(in the very least) resulted in increased suspicion, if not some discrimination against Muslims. 
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  Denmark was cited by the Human Rights Committee in its “Consideration of Reports” to Denmark in 2000 (3).	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The Social Definition of Muslim  
 The media is a significant factor worth considering while assessing the policies and 
process that have influenced the way Muslim minorities are perceived and treated in Denmark. 
Though the focus of my thesis is on the cultural elements that have contributed to the policies 
and practices that have impacted immigration in Denmark, I cannot reduce these policies to one 
single element. I must also acknowledge that there are numerous other elements and actors that 
contribute to the formation of these policies, such as extreme right parties, grass roots 
organizations, national government, transnational governments and the media (Huysmans 758). 
Of these, the media is especially instrumental in the way Muslim minorities have been perceived 
because of its extensive coverage of immigrants involved in riots in urban ghettos, which led to 
“political renderings of these riots as manifestations of incivility,” and then fueled the perception 
of immigrants as a dangerous class that poses a threat to a culture (Rey qtd. in Huysmans 763). 
In Figure 1, Peter Hervik, a	  Professor in Migration Studies in Center for the Study of at 
Aalborg University in Denmark, applies Robert Entman’s (1993) model of frame analysis to this 
incident. It represents common themes that emerged based on media coverage of the cartoon 
controversy in 232 news articles (47). From his research, Hervik concludes that Islam has been 
largely portrayed as a problem, and has been represented as a religion of violence and intolerance 
(48). These factors are supposedly demonstrated in the Muslim minority's inability to uphold a 
basic principle of Danish culture, freedom of speech, which is also a basic discourse of human 
rights. Finally, the demonization of Muslims created a “them” and “us” and a “good” versus 
“bad” distinction, as illustrated in figure 1. 
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Fig.1, The Three Frames – A Struggle of News and Views 
 
In response to the Cartoon Controversy and the overall treatment of Muslim minorities 
post 9/11, Sune Skadegaard Thorsen adds to Hervik’s discussion on the prevailing perception 
leads of Muslim minorities, by commenting on how the perceptions of Muslims in Denmark 
have influenced the way they are treated. In this excerpt, a clear picture of the social climate in 
Denmark during this time further emerges:  
Islam is under attack in Denmark and has been for some time, especially after 
September 11. Muslims have been prevented from building Mosques, from 
making burial places, from wearing scarves and holding meetings. Muslims have 
been pestered in the streets with words and with slaps. Muslim stores and clubs 
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are vandalized. Muslims are kept under surveillance, and are being arrested and 
are being portrayed in the press as uncivilized and ‘abnormal’, if not terrorists. 
The cartoons were the last straw. Let us kick who are already lying down. 
Islamophobia is raging. Muslims in Denmark must react; anything else would be 
unnatural (qtd. in Hervik 50).  
  Because of the magnitude of the response from the Islamic community, “Muslims 
became redefined as they went from being a minority in Denmark to becoming the local 
representatives of a global religious community – that is, outsiders who may pose a threat to 
Danish or Western values” (Kublitz, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2310). Also, “the fundamental 
structural differences between the Evangelic [sic] Lutheran Church and the Muslim communities 
(and other religious minorities) are seldom addressed in public debates. This ‘blind spot’ in 
relation to the constitution of Danish secularism tends to make Muslim activists susceptible to 
being classified as politically illegitimate or as Islamist” (Jakobsen; Henkel qtd. in Rytter and 
Pedersen 2311).  
  James Baldwin once said, “The most dangerous creation of any society is the man who 
has nothing to lose.” The publication of the 12 caricatures of the prophet Muhammad was the 
last straw for the Muslim community. The combination of stringent immigration policies, 
heightened surveillance and monitoring of Muslims, and the offensive illustration of a religious 
figure was all too much. Given the climate of the discourse against Muslims, it was only a matter 
of time before there was a break and some form of resistance. No matter the form this resistance 
took, it is clear that the Muslim vs. majority relations in Denmark was on the cusp of cataclysm.  
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CHAPTER 4 
The Impact of the Security/Integration Response 
 
The everyday lives of Muslims in Denmark have long been disrupted by how they have 
been portrayed, perceived and treated because of their faith and cultural difference. “Not 
surprisingly, many Muslims in Denmark [have become] frustrated about being associated with 
violence and terror because of their religious faith” (Schmidt; Mikkelson et al. qtd. in Rytter and 
Pedersen 2312). This frustration is illustrated in a study revealing that 46 percent of young 
immigrants between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine consider leaving Denmark and starting a 
new life elsewhere (Shakoor and Riis qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2312). In general the broad use 
of the term ‘radical’ may have contributed to exclusion and stigmatization of the Muslim 
community, and heightened the risk of producing the very “counter society reaction they 
intended to prevent” (Rytter and Pedersen 2313). Now, some Muslims have decided to call Syria 
and Iraq their home – opting to fight as jihadists in extremist groups such as ISIS. 
 In yet another flurry of political campaigns, this time implemented by the Ministry of 
Integration and some of the largest municipalities against radicalization, anti-radicalization 
campaigns “applied categories and definitions that were so broad that many (often young) 
Muslims found themselves [being] categorized as ‘radicalized’” (Kuhle qtd. in Rytter and 
Pedersen 2313) – thus making them the target of radicalization prevention programs in 
Denmark.  With such high attention on Muslim youth, a much larger debate has begun on 
whether the security/integration response has resulted in larger incidences of discrimination 
against the Muslim youth in Denmark (Kublitz qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2313). Using 
information cited from interviews and focus groups conducted with Muslim youth, I will explain 
the Muslim perception of the impact of the security/integration response on their identity, 
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everyday social interactions and sense of belonging. I will also discuss the concept of 
‘radicalization’ and how the Danish government seeks to combat it. Finally I will end with a 
discussion of whether or not the policies and practices employed against Muslim minorities in 
Denmark have contributed to the rise in radicalization within the Muslim population.  
  
The Effects of the Security/Integration Response  
Since 9/11, the visibility of Danish Muslims, especially Muslim youth, has become one in 
which Muslim youth are subjected to “the omnipotent gaze and pressure of external 
expectations...” (Christiansen; Khawaja qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2314). In a study of Muslim 
youth in Copenhagen, psychologist Iram Khawaja suggests, “Muslims have become hyper-
visible in the Danish landscape” (Rytter and Pedersen 2313). The security/integration response 
has cast a “panoptic gaze” on Muslims from “the majority, the media and the state (with which 
they must constantly comply)” (qtd in Rytter and Pedersen 2313) and has impacted the everyday 
lives of Muslims in Denmark. As Asad, a young informant in her study, explains:  
  
I feel sort of surveilled. You can’t just walk around and think, hey, I’m just me. 
Of course, you want to be yourself, but there is always this external pressure that 
makes you think: I have to behave, I have to behave, I have to behave, behave 
(qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen; as translated by Rytter and Pedersen 2313).  
For some Muslim youth, hyper-visibility may become a creative way through which they 
can signal their identity (Christiansen; Khawaja qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2314). This is 
particularly so for Muslim children in Denmark, who during this post 9/11 buzz surrounding 
Muslims and the Islamic faith, have been “met with questions about their religion and are asked 
to defend a faith with which they are still becoming accustomed” (Schmidt; Gilliam qtd. in 
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Rytter and Pedersen 2314). “It is likely that this will affect how they view their own position and 
belonging as Muslims in Danish society” (Rytter and Pedersen 2314).   
For Muslim youth, however, especially those who have made an effort to be active in 
Danish society on the local and national levels, there is some withdrawing from the public 
sphere. “Alongside hyper-visibility, there [also] seems to be a process of silencing developing” 
(Rytter and Pedersen 2314) as many Muslim youths have “been confronted with their stance on 
the death penalty and have been asked to denounce sharia. This latter demand in particular has 
caused many Muslims to resign from their positions and withdraw from the political scene” 
(Hervik; Jorgensen 2314). The monitoring of Muslim beliefs and behavior, as well as popular 
sentiment about how Muslims should behave, makes true integration difficult because of the 
prevalent perception of Muslims as threats.  
  
The Transnationalization of Islam: Where Do Muslims ‘Belong’?  
The presence of Muslims in the political scene post 9/11 in response to the political 
climate was largely evidenced through two Muslim groups, Hizb ut-Tahir (The Party of 
Liberation) and Muslimer i Dialog (Muslims in Dialogue), who take different approaches to how 
Muslims in Denmark should navigate their encounters with the majority. Hizb ut-Tahir 
stalwartly encourages its members to “isolate themselves and avoid contact with the Danish 
secular democratic society, which is seen as decadent and immoral [whereas] Muslimer i Dialog 
“encourages discussions about identity, integration and the rights of Muslims in Denmark” 
(Sinclair 51).  Despite their differences, both groups emphasize the importance of having a 
“network” and a sense of belonging (Sinclair 49).  
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This is linked to Muslim concept of ummah, which is seen as a “very important element 
of being a practicing Muslim...” (Sinclair 50). This is based on the concept of transnationalism, 
in which the “global brotherhood of the ummah transcends national borders and citizenship and 
so belonging to the ummah means being part of a movement that reaches back in history and 
reaches out into the future and transcends time and space (Sinclair 50). On a psychological level, 
being a member of the ummah means that the individual has become part of something greater 
than one’s self (Sinclair 50).  
In “Islam in Britain and Denmark: Deterritorialized Identity and Reterritorialzied 
Agendas,” Kristine Sinclair assumes that through transnationalization, members of Hizb ut-Tahir 
and Muslimer i Dialog are “turning to an Islam that is detached from the migrant generations’ 
Muslim homelands, just as they construct transnational identities and networks. The groups have 
chosen “Islam” as “homeland” over any concrete nation state” (51). Therefore, “ummah is 
understood as disengaged from specific national concepts” (51). With the continuous 
disenfranchisement of Muslims in Denmark, and the rise in groups such as Hizb ut-Tahir, I 
contend that Denmark’s effort for securitization may have come at the cost of integration of 
Muslims in Denmark, who may already feel like they don’t belong. The domestic consequences 
of dislocation and alienation may have led to the surge of Muslim youth leaving Denmark to 
fight for extremist organizations in Syria and Iraq.  
  
Terrorists Created? : The Increase in Radical Muslim Fighters from Denmark  
In “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical,” Louise Stigsgaard Nissen recounted her 
meeting with Abu Dinamarqi and Abu Tareq, both 23-year old Danes with Arab and Arab-
Palestinian roots, who left Denmark to join the radical group ISIS. In the article, Nissen rejects 
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the generalized portrayal of radicalized Muslims in the media, and discusses what she calls a 
more “prismatic reality” behind the motivations that propel some Muslims to these extremist 
groups. According to Nissen, “there are some who have lived their whole lives in Syria, who 
have watched their houses bombed by Bashar al-Assad’s forces and see ISIS as a default option 
to the regime; there are some who fight alongside ISIS because they have no other source of 
income; there are some who find solace in the relative order brought by ISIS; there are some who 
trek from stable democracies, like Abu Tareq did, drawn by the lure of an indefinable utopia” 
(“Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).   
Magnus Ranstorp, the Research Director of the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at 
the Swedish National Defense College, says, “Jihad is a whole new identity amongst these 
youngsters in Scandinavia” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). He adds, “They 
have been defined by the war on Islam and the war on terrorism. They feel excluded” (Nissen, 
“Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). Ranstorp’s statements are supported by Abu Tareq’s 
words in his interview with Nissen when he said, “When I saw ISIS raising their black flag in 
northern Raqqa – huge, fluttering in the wind with white signs – I was very sentimental. I felt 
that this is my identity. I don’t feel I belong in Denmark” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a 
Radical”). In the same interview, Abu Tareq also said, “I don’t really feel that Denmark is my 
home. Mentally, I’m in Raqqa” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).   
Unlike researchers, the Danish police have a different explanation for the increase in 
fighters leaving Denmark to join ISIS in Syria. Allan Aarslev, the head of criminal prevention 
with Aarhus Police, described the increased Muslim exodus to Syria as a “trend amongst these 
young people” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). He continued, “They feel that 
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Muslims have been under attack after 9/11. The attraction is to be a part of the war in Syria, to be 
seen as active and cool” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).  
Nissen also notes that the feelings and choices of Abu Dinamarqi, Abu Tareq and other 
Danish fighters in ISIS and other groups do not represent the entire Muslim population in 
Denmark. I second Nissen’s assertion; not all second generation Muslim immigrants are attracted 
to the idea of fighting for ISIS or any other extremist group, nor are they interested in leaving 
Denmark. Therefore, I cannot generalize radicalization as the choice for all Muslim youth living 
in Denmark who have had unfavorable experiences socially or via policy. Nonetheless, for 
countries such as the United States and other European countries, the dramatic growth in ISIS 
fighters is alarming because of the fear that these fighters may return to their countries and 
commit acts of terrorism on their native soil (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).   
For Denmark in particular, this a grave concern since Denmark “has produced more 
fighters per head of population since 2012 than any other Western European country except 
Belgium” (Crouch and Henley, “A Way Home for Jihadis”). There have also been at least four 
cases in which Danes have been involved in acts of terror – the first being in November 2013 
when “a Danish-born suicide bomber, a blonde convert named Victor Kristensen, blew himself 
up in an ISIS mission in Iraq. Since then, three other Danish citizens, two of them Danish-Arab 
and one Danish-Pakistani, have committed suicide attacks for Islamic extremist groups in the 
Middle East” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).  
 
Radicalization Prevention Measures 
Denmark’s efforts at strengthening its security measures were greatly heightened post 
9/11; however discourse on radicalization was still prominent. Following the initial 
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implementation of the security/integration response, Denmark ushered in another counter 
radicalization initiative in 2009. This project, also known as the government’s action plan, was 
called “A Common and Safe Future.” “ A Common and Safe Future” was to be overseen by the 
Center for Prevention, a sector of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET). According 
to the PET, the goal of the program was to “encourage people to change their behaviour towards 
a non-extremist direction by means of direct contact and dialogue. The idea [was] for PET to 
support the actors that are best placed to reach vulnerable people by equipping them with tools 
for tackling the difficult challenges” (“The Centre for Prevention”).   
When outlining its radicalization prevention initiative, the Danish government used the 
standard definition of radicalization, which is, “the process in which a person gradually accepts 
the ideas and methods of extremism and, possibly, joins its organised [sic] groups. Personal 
circumstances, group dynamics as well as political, financial and cultural factors may all 
contribute to radicalisation [sic] processes” (Government of Denmark). Additionally, the 
government’s packet rejected the idea that Denmark is “hostile towards– or outright waging war 
against – Islam or Muslims” and instead noted that there is a common concern that radical 
Islamism is threatening to Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Government of Denmark).    
The action plan also discusses the “negative and distorted perception” of Denmark that 
has emerged since Denmark’s involvement in the war on terror, and asserts that the government 
works to promote the “fundamental values of freedom, security and opportunities for all, and 
fight the forces that want violence, hatred and oppression” both domestically and internationally 
(Government of Denmark). According to the document, these goals are being pursued through 
initiatives such as counter-terrorism, international co-operation on peace, development and 
democracy (as demonstrated through the fight against poverty in Africa, the overall engagement 
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in Afghanistan, the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme, the long-term political commitment to 
ensure a just and viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc.) (Government of 
Denmark). 
Lasse Lindekilde, a researcher in the Department of Political Science at Aarhus 
University in Denmark, notes that   “A Common and Safe Future" has been targeted towards 
Muslims, thus suggesting that Muslims are deemed to be violence-prone “radicals” who should 
be encouraged to become active citizens in Danish society (Lindekilde 110). Lindekilde also 
asserted that the action plan would have “inotropic effects” due to its programming structure as 
well as its hard focus on Muslims (Lindekelde 110). For Lindekelde, the Danish action plan is 
laden with what he calls “a particular concept of the “ideal citizen,” which he Lindekelde 
describes as “someone who is responsible and liberal. He also notes that radicalization is the 
opposite of this. Therefore, this alternative identity is “negative” (117). He continues to say:  
The ideal citizen of the action plan is first and foremost pro-democratic and non-
violent, and non-supportive/non-sympathetic vis-à-vis violent o[f] un-democratic 
groups. The ideal citizen is also responsible and active. In several parts of the 
action plan active citizenship, in terms of participation in associational life and 
democratic procedures, is praised as an important aspect of citizenship. Becoming 
such an active citizen who contributes to the common good is framed in the action 
plan as an individual responsibility. Thus, ideal citizens not only oppose violent 
and undemocratic methods, they also play an active and responsible part in 
society (177).  
Lindekilde’s line of analysis is evocative of past discourse on integration and 
immigration that suggests the existence of a parallel in the discourse between the diction found 
Anderson 57 
in “A Common and Safe Future” and other material discussed in previous chapters.  Also, 
Despite the Danish government’s attempt to countering its criticism, I find Lindkelde’s point to 
be particularly interesting because it relates closely to the aforementioned statement by the PET, 
which says, “…to support the actors that are best placed to reach vulnerable people…” thus 
suggesting that there is indeed a target population. With the War on Terror raging against Islamic 
radicalism, there is surely a greater focus placed on Muslims.  
  
From Radicalization Prevention to De-radicalization  
The “Common and Safe Future” action plan ended in 2012, but the surge of Islamist 
radicalism did not; neither did Denmark’s efforts at counter-terrorism. In addition to joining the 
United States, Belgium and other states in the military fights against ISIS, Denmark has also 
begun a de-radicalization program in 2014 for jihadist fighters returning from Syria.   This 
initiative, costing 60.9 million kroner (9.2 million U.S. dollars) (The Associated Press, 
“Denmark Spends $9 Million on De-Radicalization Programs”), was the successor to the “A 
Common and Safe Future” action plan, and a symbol of Denmark’s evolution from radicalization 
prevention to de-radicalization.  
According to Ayan Sheikh, a reporter from PBS News Hour, Denmark is not the only 
country with a terrorist rehabilitation program. Instead, it has joined countries like Singapore and 
Saudi Arabia, who have been offering terrorism habilitation programs to former jihadi fighters 
following 9/11 (“Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”). Denmark’s terrorist 
rehabilitation program is based in Aarhus, Denmark’s second largest city. The program is 
designed to follow a more liberal approach, by offering returning fighters and their families a 
“wide range of services that include treating psychological trauma and wounds sustained from 
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shrapnel and gunshots. Families are put in touch with intelligence agencies and government 
officials tasked with bringing their loved ones home. De-radicalized fighters would also receive 
help to find jobs and continue with their education” (Sheikh, “Denmark Unveils De-
radicalization Program”). 
Bharati Naik, Atika Shubert and Nick Thompson from CNN report that “those returning 
must be screened by police, and anyone found to have committed a crime will be put through the 
courts and possibly prison.” [However], the program does not try to change the fundamentalist 
beliefs of the returning fighters – as long as they don’t advocate violence (“Denmark Offers 
Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Despite this, Sheikh reports that Danish officials in Aarhus have 
deemed the program a success, due to the “sharp decrease in the number of Danish nationals 
[fleeing] to the Middle East” (“Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”). Sheikh also says 
that officials saw only 22 reported people join an extremist group in 2013, and only one in 2014 
(“Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”). Despite what appear to be good reviews of the 
Danish de-radicalization program, Denmark has come under scrutiny from countries such as the 
U.K, which has a vastly different approach, as illustrated in the image below:  
Fig. 2, Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab Without Jail Time – But Will It Work? 
  
CNN. Web. 07 Apr. 2015 
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In the U.K, vastly different measures are employed when dealing with returning jihadist 
fighters. These measures often involve “surveillance, terror charges and jail time” (Naik, Shubert 
and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”), as well as efforts to ban 
fighters from returning home entirely. This is due to fear of the influx of “home grown terrorists” 
who may cause an attack on their native soil (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers 
Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Like Denmark’s “A Common and Safe Future” action plan, the 
UK also has radicalization prevention programs, but nothing targeting returning fighters from 
Syria (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”).  
Another reason for the stark differences between both countries is the fact that “It is not 
illegal according to Danish law to go to Syria” (Naik, Shubbert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers 
Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”).  Police Commissioner Jorgen IIum stated that law 
enforcement’s inability to stop people from going to Syria did not deter them from trying  “to 
persuade the young people not to go to Syria.” He added, “We could tell them about the risks 
that they might encounter going to Syria. We could tell them about the Danish legislation that 
makes it illegal to participate in direct terrorist acts and if they did do [sic] they might be 
punished when they come back” (Naik, Shubbert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some 
Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Naik, Shubbert and Thompson say that the program is designed to 
provide reintegration services, but also to keep close watch on returned fighters (“Denmark 
Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). 
In defense of the program Jorgen IIum added, “this is not a gift shop. You have to be 
motivated; you have to really want to become a part of the Danish society. We help them find a 
way through the system, and what we’ve seen is that out of the sixteen who have returned, ten of 
them are now back in school and now have a job, and it seems to us that their focus is on 
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something else than in Syria” (Shubert, “Denmark’s De-radicalization for Jihadis”). In response 
to the approach to tackling the returning fighters’ fundamentalist beliefs, IIum stated, “They are 
still Muslim believers, some of them perhaps in a way that we would call ‘radical’ but not to an 
extent that (as far as we can see) they are a threat to the society” (Shubert, “Denmark’s De-
radicalization for Jihadis”). 
 Denmark’s de-radicalization initiative is still very new, and there is no way to 
definitively gauge the success of this program at this time. However, based on Police 
Commissioner IIum’s statements, there seems to be no present concerns about the impact of 
Denmark’s decision to rehabilitate its radicalized Muslim fighters on the wider Danish society. 
Instead, the combination of assistance and monitoring by the PET seems to suffice. I also would 
say that with the focus on integration, the Danish resolve for de-radicalization and reintegration 
of its jihadi Muslim groups symbolizes the beginning of a shift in the ways in which the Danes 
relate to and interact with the Muslim population. I cannot speak to how this program will impact 
Muslims in their daily lives, but I can say that this initiative may indeed be an acknowledgement 
of the impact that marginalization and poor integration have had in cultivating the sense of 
statelessness and resentment, which would have driven some other Muslims, like Abu Tareq, to 
find a place where they would feel welcomed and ultimately to radicalization.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
Denmark post 2001 is unlike the nation that we have come to appreciate for its 
international involvement in human rights. The shift from liberalism to nationalism, along with 
the decade-long leadership of the right wing populist party, DPP, has propagated the need to 
protect the Danish customs, in terms of culture, language and social norms. In an effort to 
maintain the nation’s security, the Danish government has implemented several domestic 
security and integration-focused policies and practices that have targeted Muslims and Muslim 
immigrants. In the process, a cross-cultural tension has emerged between the Muslim minority 
and the general populous, thus resulting in several clashes that have led to numerous casualties 
and an underlying uncertainty about the next act of radical terrorism in Denmark. 
In examining the conditions under which immigrants were embraced by Denmark, we see 
that the country only extended this welcome in an effort to improve its economic market, while 
taking advantage of cheap labor. As Denmark’s economy strengthened and the need for 
immigrant lessened, immigrant presence in Denmark evoked negative sentiments from the 
general populous. Focusing on the gradual changes in the perceptions of immigrants in Denmark 
over time, we see how the socio-cultural and political discourse on immigration helped shape 
public sentiments on the role of immigrants in a country that was recovering from economic 
shifts, resulting from globalization. 
 From early on, there was a concern that accepting immigrants with cultural differences 
would result in a form of socio-cultural deviance, which contrasted Danish norms. The fear of 
multiculturalism, combined with the absence of a structured immigration policy also created 
difficulties in assessing how to deal with the influx of immigrants in the 1970’s (Jønsson 593). 
With strong anti-immigration rhetoric on the potential dangers posed by people of different 
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cultures and religions (Rydgren 484), it is understandable how Islam would not be exempt from 
the generalized assumption that people with religious and cultural differences were incompatible 
or even threatening to the fiber of Danish society. 
Amidst such tension, the DPP was able to grow while fueling the frenzy surrounding the 
immigration debate. The fact that a terrorist attack happened in the midst of this chaos was 
unfortunate for Muslims, but it was a lucky coincidence for the DPP, which was elected shortly 
after 9/11 (and after campaigning heavily against immigration). Given that 9/11was a series of 
serious attacks, there was a genuine need for security. Given that 9/11 was carried out by 
radicalized Muslim terrorists, there was also a documented reason to ensure public safety against 
religiously motivated terrorism which – from an essentialist view – was associated with Islam.  
What started as a reaction a tragic and unfortunate event, morphed into a security and integration 
focused system, designed to ensure the highest degree of cultural conformity. After 9/11, we saw 
the intersection between integration and security, and the amalgam of obstacles the security and 
integration measures caused for Muslims living in Denmark, Muslim immigrants, non-
Nordic/non-Western immigrants, and refugees or asylum seekers at large. 
Throughout the paper, we see the gradual changes in the immigration policy, which 
became progressively stringent – ultimately reaching its peak in 2010. The incessant discussion 
of the duties of immigrants to a society, along with the ever increasing requirements for 
obtaining citizenship or permanent residency, display how the lack of multicultural policies have 
made the inclusion of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers more difficult (Huysmans 753). 
Close examination of Denmark’s immigration policies reveal the varying parameters developed 
to measure and ensure the “worthiness” of citizenship and permanent resident applicants outside 
of ‘culturally close’ Nordic countries (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). My analysis revealed that a 
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“successfully” integrated immigrant/ “good” immigrant was someone who demonstrated 
knowledge of the Danish language, culture and social norms, and demonstrated self-reliance 
through employment, which would decrease dependence on the welfare state (Jensen et al. 6). 
Ultimately, by Danish standards, the people considered “good” immigrants were usually 
Christian or from another Nordic countries. Their immigration experience was often easier 
because of the “special fast-track naturalization procedures” made available to them by Denmark 
(Mouritsen and Olsen 700).  
In my discussion of the historic Danish effort to protect Danish Jews from being captured 
by Nazis during the Holocaust, my intention was not to undermine the significance of this event, 
but to highlight the undercurrents in Danish society at the time, which also contributed to the 
gallant endeavor. After examining the motives behind the rescue of Jews from the Nazis, I would 
say that the goal of the rescue mission was not entirely about the Jews, nor was it for Danish land 
or to overthrow Nazis with the goal of making them irrelevant. The battle for Denmark was a 
battle for its soul, and for its “distinctively Danish values and traditions”(Buckser 21). From the 
high levels of Jewish assimilation in Denmark, I would say that Jews in some way shared in the 
Danish values and traditions. Therefore, in the context of the time, their rescue was more because 
of their acceptance as fellow Danes, rather than the fact that they were Jews. 
 Returning to my larger point about the experience of Jews and Muslims in Denmark, I 
hoped to show the parallels between the experiences of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe in 
the 1980s and Muslims today. From the discussion, you see that both these non-assimilated Jews 
and Muslims were subjected to derogatory expressions against their culture and religion. Recall, 
both groups of people endured offences through caricatures that were drawn in mockery of their 
religions; both were deemed outsiders in a Christian nation, etc.  
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 The 2006 Cartoon Controversy holds particular significance because of the magnitude of 
the uproar and backlash against the majority and the Danish government, from the Muslim 
community. Here, we begin to see what appears to be the breaking point for the Muslim 
community. Arguably, the events that unfolded after this point were inevitable, especially 
because the controversy only heightened the pointed criticism of Muslims in the media, while 
furthering the negative perceptions that follow Muslims in their everyday lives. In essence, 9/11 
furthered the shift in Muslim-majority relations, but the publishing of the cartoons in 2006 was 
the spark that triggered a cataclysmic chain of events that would lead to protests and violence in 
unimaginable proportions.  
What results next can be seen as an illustration of some of the ways in which the Muslim 
community opted to cope with their hyper-visibility in the media, following their attempts at self 
advocacy. By looking at the different responses to hyper-visibility, I sought to show how instead 
of retreating from the public sphere (as some Muslims did), some Muslims chose to make their 
home elsewhere altogether, choosing to join extremist groups in countries such as in Iraq and 
Syria. Despite the large number of Muslim jihadi fighters in Syria and elsewhere, I cannot assert 
that Danish laws and policies focused on Muslims and Muslim immigrants have exclusively 
resulted in radicalized Muslim youth. However, I will say that these laws and policies have 
resulted in some Muslim youth feeling disconnected – as if they do not belong.  
In February 2015, a 22-year old male of Palestinian descent embarked on a shooting 
spree that was “the worst terror spree in three decades” (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). Omar Abdel 
Hamid el-Hussein attacked a free-speech seminar, and a synagogue in Copenhagen after he was 
released from jail – about two weeks prior to the incident – for viciously attacking a passenger 
on the train with a knife (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). While serving his 15-month sentence, el-
Anderson 65 
Hussein allegedly expressed an interest in going to Syria to join ISIS, and PET was called to 
monitor him as a potential terror threat (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). It is unclear what (if any) 
counter-radicalization measures were taken to assist el-Hussein, but it is clear that el-Hussein 
never actually left Denmark to join ISIS. His radicalization allegedly occurred during his 
incarceration where he was inspired by the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris, France that killed 
17 people (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). Described as somewhat aggressive, but talented and 
incredibly smart, el-Hussein was a rising star at Copenhagen’s Muay Thai kickboxing club and 
was also passionate in political discussions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Chrisafis, 
“Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”). El-Hussein’s associates say that he was “not a terrorist [but 
instead]…someone who felt finished with life and decided to go out with a big bang” (Chrisafis, 
“Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”).  
Speaking with Karl Ritter from The World Post, Jesper Braarud Larsen, a Danish court 
reporter who covered el-Hussein’s trial in December said el-Hussein didn’t come across as 
religious, and had the appearance of a “hardened criminal,” his shaved head pocked by scars 
(“Omar Abdel”). Although Mr. Larsen is no counter-radicalization expert, it is notable that he 
somehow expected el-Hussein to “come across as religious,” thus suggesting that the essentialist 
perception of “religious people” as threats is still evident even today. In the case of el-Hussein, 
Angelique Chrisafis from the Huffington Post reports that el-Hussein had a history of cannabis 
use and appeared to suffer from anxiety (“Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”). By all accounts, he 
was just a Danish-born young man who had lost his way after dropping out of school and later 
becoming homeless (Chrisafis, “Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”). El-Hussein’s appearance may 
have told quite the tale but – by appearances alone – there is simply no way of determining who 
is or isn’t a possible terror threat, as demonstrated by Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian far-
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right terrorist responsible for the deaths of 77 people on Utøya island, Norway in 2011. 
Moreover, radicalization is not isolated to just Muslims or those of Muslim descent. Counter-
radicalization efforts must be implemented in such a way that they extend to everyone who could 
be a threat, not just “religious” Muslims. By isolating one subset of people, Denmark’s counter-
radicalization program may be missing chances to counteract other terrorist threats, from sources 
where it may be least expected. 
In addition to its counter-radicalization efforts, the Danish government has undertaken a 
de-radicalization initiative, in what appears to be an effort to entice radicalized fighters to return 
to Denmark, and to pursue a life that does not include extremist crime and violence. By offering 
resources such as education, housing and employment to returning fighters – through this 
optional program – it seems quite plausible that fighters who have not committed any crimes 
would be willing to return to Denmark, without fear of prosecution. Known returning fighters are 
screened by police, and only face legal action if they have indeed committed a crime, and are 
also monitored by Danish intelligence (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some 
Foreign Fighters Rehab”).  
Unlike Denmark, France has chosen a more hardline approach to monitoring returning 
“Islamists” and other fighters from Syria and Iraq. Focusing on surveillance and meta data 
collection, the French government has passed a new surveillance law in the wake of the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks. Often compared to the United States’ Patriot Act – which was passed weeks after 
the 9/11 attacks – the French law allows authorities to tap phones and emails,	  spy on the digital 
and mobile phone communications of anyone linked to a “terrorist” inquiry (therefore forcing 
internet service providers and phone companies to give up data upon request), and place cameras 
and recording devices in private homes and install keylogger devices that record every key stroke 
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on a targeted computer in real time. The law also allows for mass data collection, which will be 
analyzed for “potentially suspicious behaviour” – all this is permitted without a warrant from a 
judge (Chrisafis, “France Passes New Surveillance Law”).  
The rampant radicalization of Muslims and the increase in the numbers of other militant 
fighters have resulted in a number of reactive measures, laws and policies aimed at securing 
individual states. With surveillance and mass data collection becoming the new means of 
security, the implementation of hardline surveillance laws have raised questions about their 
possible infringement on constitutional freedoms and liberties. Beyond this, there is a concern 
that the targeted subjects may largely be ethnic and religious minorities. Denmark, like its 
European counterparts such as France, the Netherlands and Austria have been enthralled in 
controversy surrounding their prominent far-right parties and their issues of border control and 
security for many years. Although Denmark’s terrorist securitization policy is not as rigid as 
France’s or the UK’s, Denmark’s new de-radicalization program is only in its early stages, and 
may require changes in the future. 
 For now, what is clear about Denmark’s existing laws is that the creation of security and 
integration policies – in response to cultural mixing based on migration – became politicized in 
the form of challenges to the welfare state (Huysmans 762). Denmark’s effort to thwart “threats” 
such as (illegal) immigration, and terrorism have led to the institutionalization of policies and 
practices that have produced larger issues surrounding how “outsiders” are viewed and treated. 
In this globalized world, migration policy has to address the reality that European countries are 
becoming diverse (Huysmans 672). Cultural homogeneity is not being “threatened,” it simply 
cannot exist where there is immigration. “The political rendering of cultural identity involves a 
mixture of issues including multiculturalism, European identity nationalism, and xenophobia and 
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racism” (Huysmans 762). The result is a cultural war, which raises questions about the European 
approach to culture and racial identity, and their role in the politics of inclusion (Huysmans 761). 
Moreover, the pattern of labeling particular categories of people as a danger has not just made 
the inclusion of immigrants (Muslim and non-European), refugees and asylum-seekers more 
difficult, but has also impacted “the kind of solidarity, social integration, cultural identity, 
civility and public order that is promoted in the community” (Huysmans 771). 
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APPENDIX 
RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES – DENMARK 
 
International Bill of Human Rights  Signature   Ratification  Accession  Succession   Entry into Force 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights   20 Mar 1968  6 Jan 1972  
   International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 20 Mar 1968  6 Jan 1972  
   Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 20 Mar 1968  6 Jan 1972   
  Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition 
of the death penalty 13 Feb 1990  24 Feb 1994  
   Prevention of Discrimination on the 
Basis of Race, Religion, or Belief; and 
Protection of Minorities  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 21 Jun 1966  9 Dec 1971   
  Women's Human Rights  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 17 Jul 1980  21 Apr 1983    
  Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women 10 Dec 1999  31 May 2000  
   United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime 12 Dec 2000 30 Sep 2003 
   Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime Preamble, 
supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime 12 Dec 2000 30 Sep 2003 
   Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime 12 Dec 2000   
   Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Slavery Convention 
 
17 May 1927  
   Protocol amending the Slavery 
Convention 
 
3 Mar 1954  
(Definitive Sign) 
   Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to 27 Jun 1957 24 Apr 1958 
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Slavery 
Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of the Prostitution of 
Others 12 Feb 1951  
    Protection from Torture, Ill-
Treatment and Disappearance  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
European Convention for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 26 Nov 1987 2 May 1989 
  
1 Sep 1989  
Protocol No. 1 to the European 
Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 4 Nov 1993  26 Apr 1994 
  
1 Mar 2002  
Protocol No. 2 to the European 
Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment 4 Nov 1993  26 Apr 1994 
  
1 Mar 2002  
Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment 4 Feb 1985  27 May 1987  
   Rights of the Child  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 26 Jan 1990  19 Jul 1991  
   Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed 
conflicts 7 Sep 2000  27 Aug 2002  
   Convention concerning the Prohibition 
and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour 
 
14 Aug 2000  
   Freedom of Association   Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organise Convention 
 
13 Jun 1951  
   Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention 
 
15 Aug 1955  
   Employment and Forced Labour  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Convention concerning Forced or 
Compulsory Labour 
 
11 Feb 1932  
   Equal Remuneration Convention 
 
22 Jun 1960  
   Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 
 
17 Jan 1958 
   Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention 
 
22 Jun 1960  
   Employment Policy Convention 
 
17 Jun 1970  
   Convention concerning Occupational 
Safety and Health and the Working 
Environment 
 
10 Jul 1995  
   Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families Not signed 
    Education  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Convention against Discrimination in 
Education 
 
Ratified  
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Refugees and Asylum  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees 28 Jul 1951 4 Dec 1952  
   Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 
  
29 Jan 1968  
  Nationality, Statelessness, and the 
Rights of Aliens Signature Ratification  Accession Succession Entry into Force 
Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness 
  
11 Jul 1977 
  Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons 28 Sep 1954 17 Jan 1956  
   War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, Genocide, and Terrorism  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity Not signed 
    Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 28 Sep 1949  15 Jun 1951 
   Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court 25 Sep 1998 21 Jun 2001  
   Law of Armed Conflict  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field 12 Aug 1949 
27 Jun 1951 
(rat/acced)  
   Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea  12 Aug 1949 
27 Jun 1951 
(rat/acced)  
   Geneva Convention relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War 12 Aug 1949 
27 Jun 1951 
(rat/acced)  
   Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War 12 Dec 1977 
17 Jun 1982 
(rat/acced) 
   Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I) 12 Dec 1977 
17 Jun 1982 
(rat/acced) 
   Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims on 
Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) 12 Dec 1977 
17 Jun 1982 
(rat/acced) 
   Terrorism and Human Rights  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
International Convention Against the 
Taking of Hostages 
  
11 Aug 1987 
  International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing 
 
31 Aug 2001  
   International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism 
 
27 Aug 2002 
   International Convention for the 16 Dec 1970 17 Oct 1972 
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Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft 
International Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against International Protected Persons 
 
1 Jul 1975  
   U.N. Activities and Employees  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations   
 
10 Jun 1948  
  Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel 15 Dec 1994 11 Apr 1995  
   Regional Conventions  Signature  Ratification  Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
[European] Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 4 Nov 1950  13 Apr 1953 
  
3 Sep 1953  
Protocol to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 20 Mar 1952  13 Apr 1953 
  
18 May 1954  
Protocol No.2 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 6 May 1963  6 May 1963  
  
21 Sep 1970  
Protocol No.3 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 6 May 1963  6 May 1963  
  
21 Sep 1970  
Protocol No.4 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 16 Sep 1963  30 Sep 1964 
  
2 May 1968  
Protocol No.5 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 20 Jan 1966 20 Jan 1966 
  
20 Dec 1971  
Protocol No.6 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 28 Apr 1983  1 Dec 1983 
  
1 Mar 1985  
Protocol No.7 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 22 Nov 1984  18 Aug 1988 
  
1 Nov 1988  
Protocol No. 8 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 19 Mar 1985  19 Mar 1985  
  
1 Jan 1990 
Protocol No. 9 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 6 Nov 1990  14 Feb 1996  
  
1 Jun 1996  
Protocol No. 10 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 25 Mar 1992  18 Jul 1996  
   Protocol No. 11 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 11 May 1994 18 Jul 1996 
  
1 Nov 1998  
Protocol No. 12 to the 1950 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Not signed  
    European Convention for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 26 Nov 1987  2 May 1989 
  
1 Sep 1989  
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Protocol No. 1 to the European 
Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 4 Nov 1993  26 Apr 1994 
  
1 Mar 2002  
Protocol No. 2 to the European 
Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment 4 Nov 1993  26 Apr 1994 
  
1 Mar 2002  
African Regional Conventions Signature Ratification Accession  Succession  Entry into Force 
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights * Not signed          
Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa * Not signed          
Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa * Not signed          
Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples' Rights * Not signed          
African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child * Not signed          
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